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I. INTRODUCTION
Tanya Barrett's family called 9-1-1 after her
mother shot herself in the chest. Soon after, the
family realized their mother was dead. When the
police and emergency squad arrived, a dispute
arose as the family tried to prevent officials from
disturbing the mother's body. Police forced the
family to wait outside the house for hours, yet al-
lowed a television crew inside to film them as they
re-enacted their investigation of the scene. Pic-
tures of the dead mother's body were later broad-
cast.'
The family filed suit in federal district court
against both the police and the broadcast station,
stating several causes of action, including viola-
tion of their Fourth Amendment right to be free
of unreasonable searches and seizures, and the
state tort law claims of trespass and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. 2 The court ruled
that the broadcasters "were not privileged by the
First Amendment to enter [the family's] home
* The author (PhD, University of North Carolina-Chapel
Hill) is director of research development at the University of
Rhode Island.
I Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726, 731-
33 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
2 Id. at 730, 737.
3 Id. at 748.
4 In this article, "ride-along reporting" will be defined as
those situations in which media representatives, for the pur-
pose of gathering publishable material, accompany author-
ized individuals performing official duties. For purposes of
this article, an authorized individual is defined as one who,
through his or her job, has power or access that others do
not. In the fide-along cases, the authorized individual shared
that power or access with the media, which gave rise to a legal
claim. See David E. Bond, Police Liability for the Media "Ride-
Along, " 77 B.U. L. REV. 825 (1997). Although this term and
similar ones, such as "tag-along reporting," see Casey Tourtil-
lott, Wilson v. Layne: The Growing Relationship Between Law En-
forcement and the Media: Should it Extend into Private Homes?, 67
UMKC L. REV. 445, 460 (1998), and "sidekick journalism," see
Kent R. Middleton, Journalists, Trespass and Officials: Closing
the Door on Fla. Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 16 PEPP. L. REV.
without permission, or to film and broadcast" the
inside of the home. 3
Barrett's case stems from what has become
known as "ride-along reporting."4 This style of re-
porting is an increasingly common practice, par-
ticularly among television outlets, as they seek to
attract and maintain an audience. 5 The resulting
footage is often used on shows referred to as "real-
ity TV," which offer a "cinema verite-style"6 look at
their subject. Cops, with its reggae theme song
"Bad Boys," is credited with being the first televi-
sion program in this genre, airing in 1989 on Fox
Television. 7 Imitations were quick to spring up,
and the reality TV genre became increasingly
popular in the 1990s. By the middle of the dec-
ade, there were ten reality shows being widely
aired around the country.8 More recently, reality
TV has taken its cameras everywhere from the
hospital emergency room9 to the bathroom
stall. 10
Not surprisingly, lawsuits have followed," and,
259, 260 (1989) have been frequently used in recent years,
their meanings differ slightly.
5 See, e.g., David Tobenkin, Real Stories of a Crowded Genre,
BROAD. & CABLE, May 22, 1995, at 16; Tom Shales, Harsh Real-
ity: Are Dramas and Sitcoms Television's Weakest Link?, WASH.
POST, Aug. 9, 2001, at CI (discussing the abundance of real-
ity programming).
6 Cynthia Littleton, True Blue, BROAD. & CABLE, May 20,
1996, at 26.
7 Id.
8 Tobenkin, supra note 5, at 18.
9 See, e.g., William C. Schumacher, Lights! Camera! Blood!
Action!, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2000, at W15.
10 Linda Moss, Facing Legal Realities: Lawsuit Potential
Challenges Producers of "Unscripted" Shows, BROAD. & CABLE,
Oct. 8, 2001, at 23 (highlighting a camera crew for a VH1
show, "Bands on the Run," which followed a woman into a
bathroom stall).
I I Reality TV shows were not the catalyst for most of the
cases identified for this study; only a handful of these cases
arose from such programming. See generally Reeves v. Fox Tel-
evision Network, 983 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (involv-
ing the program "Cops"); Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp.
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courts have been grappling with these cases
throughout the past decade. The U.S. Supreme
Court set limits on ride-along reporting when it
decided Wilson v. Layne12 in 1999, a case in which
a newspaper reporter and photographer accom-
panied police who were executing a warrant into
a home. The Court held that, "it is a violation of
the Fourth Amendment for police to bring mem-
bers of the media or other third parties into a
home during the execution of a warrant when the
presence of the third parties in the home was not
in aid of the execution of the warrant."' 3 The fact
that police were executing a warrant was an inte-
gral part of the holding in Wilson.14 However, as
illustrated in Tanya Barrett's case, not all ride-
alongs involved police executing warrants in pri-
vate homes. 15 So, the holding in Wilson does not
address many situations from which ride-along lit-
igation arose. While Wilson indicates that limita-
tions to the practice are now being set, for years, a
varied legal landscape has characterized ride-
along cases. This paper will clarify for plaintiffs,
officials, and the media the rules that are now
emerging.
. Press justifications for ride-along reporting have
fallen into two categories, which reflect the major
media, or "press," theories said to attach to the
First Amendment. One argument is that ride-
alongs allow the press to check on government, 16
a press function that flows from libertarian
theory.17 The other argument is that ride-alongs
satisfy the public's right to know, a press function
that flows from the social responsibility theory."'
The case analysis presented below will show that
media ride-alongs conflict with both of these
theories.
362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), affd sub nom. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d
680 (2d Cir. 1994) (involving the show "Street Stories");
Crowley v. Fox Broad. Co., 851 F. Supp. 700 (D. Md. 1994)
(discussing the program "Code 3"); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828
F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (involving the program "Street
Stories"); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469
(Cal. 1998) (discussing the show "On Scene: Emergency Re-
sponse").
12 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
13 Id. at 614.
14 Id. at 613-14.
15 See Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726
(S.D. Ohio 1997).
16 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 3 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 521 (1977). See also Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 613 (1999); Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co.,
632 F. Supp. 1282, 1290 (N.D. Il. 1986).
17 See FRED S. SIEBERT ET AL.. FOUR THEORIES OF THE
A. Protections for Newsgathering
The First Amendment has been interpreted as
providing broad protections for expression, but
not for newsgathering.19 Two theories, libertarian
theory and social responsibility theory, each defin-
ing the duties of government and of the press, un-
derlie much of newsgathering law.2 0' Legal
scholar Steven Helle has observed that the choice
of theory argued determines whether a case is de-
cided in favor of the press, or of the govern-
ment.
2 1
According to Helle, libertarian theory, with
roots in the seventeenth-century writings of John
Milton and John Locke, has led to decisions
favorable to the press in newsgathering cases. 22
Decisions in newsgathering cases that favor the
government's ability to place limits on the press
have generally been based on the social responsi-
bility theory, which grew from a 1947 report by
the Commission on Freedom of the Press 2 also
known as the Hutchins Commission. 24 Although
these theories, discussed in detail in the 1956
work Four Theories of the Press,25 have become
dated, they are worth reviewing here because
their influence is still seen in First Amendmentju-
risprudence, particularly in newsgathering
cases.
26
Libertarian theory values the "free and open ex-
change of ideas as the best means of achieving
truth. '27 It also views freedom of expression as a
way to foster self-fulfillment and to control gov-
ernment.2 8 Realization of these goals depends,
Helle argues, on adherence to two key principles:
independence from government 29 and emphasis
on the right of the individual. 30 In a libertarian
PRESS 7 (1956) (discussing libertarian theory).
18 See id. at 7.
19 Steven Helle, The News-Gathering/Publication Dichotomy
and Government Expression, 1982 DuKE L.J. 1, 3 (1982).
20 Id. at 4-6, 20-22.
21 Id. at 3.
22 Id. at 4-6. See also SIEBERT ET AL., supra note 17, at 44-
46.
23 SIEBERT ET AL., supra note 17, at 75.
24 Helle, supra note 19, at 20.
25 SIEBERT ET AL., supra note 17.
26 See WILLIAM E. BERRY ET AL., LAST RIGHTS: REVISITING
FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS (John C. Nerone ed., 1995).
27 Helle, supra note 19, at 5.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 5-9.
30o Id. at 9-13.
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framework, "the state derives its authority from
the consent of the governed,"' 3 1 with the rights of
the individual defining the extent of the state's
power. 32
Libertarianism presupposes that the roles of
the government and the press are closely inter-
twined in a democratic society.33 Freedom of the
press is justified because it serves democracy; the
press' crucial role is that of a watchdog, or check,
over the three branches of government. 34 It is as-
sumed that the government is the primary con-
cern of the press, and that limits on expression
are most likely to come from government.
3 5
Contemporary commentators have noted that
extragovernmental actors, such as transnational
corporations, now equal or exceed governments
in resources and power.3 6 This shift in power chal-
lenges the old assumption that threats to individ-
ual freedom are most likely to come from the gov-
ernment, and that the press' job is to keep this
governmental power in check. 37 While this is a
valid criticism of libertarian theory, as put forth by
Siebert nearly half a century ago, it is not a fatal
flaw for purposes of ride-along reporting analysis.
By definition, ride-alongs involve both the press
and government, and the part of libertarian
theory dealing with that relationship continues to
be sound. In fact, the media have sometimes used
the checking value to justify ride-alongs. For in-
stance, in an amici curiae brief filed in Wilson v.
Layne, major media organizations argued that the
practice aids in the scrutiny of official conduct.3
In other cases, however, the media have in-
voked social responsibility theory, using the "pub-
lic's right to access to information of public inter-
est" to justify ride-alongs.3 9 John Langley, co-crea-
tor of Cops, said of the reality TV-style program, "it
is pro-social. It can inspire people to think about
solutions to problems. It can be enlightening to
visit the problems within one's own society."
40
31 Id. at 10.
32 Id.
-3 SIEBERT ET AL., supra note 17, at 51.
34 See Blasi, supra note 16 (discussing the checking value
of the First Amendment, which is informed by libertarian
theory).
15 BERRY, supra note 26, at 176.
'1 Id. at 159-60.
37 Id.
38 Brief of Amici Curiae of ABC, Inc., et al. at 4-5, Wilson
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (No. 98-83).
39 Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 222 (N.Y.
StIp. Ct. 1981). See also Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745,
754 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 632 F.
Under social responsibility theory, arguments for
a newsgathering right rest primarily on the need
of a self-governing people to be informed.41 As
described by Helle, the two key principles to reali-
zation of social responsibility theory are govern-
ment intervention and public interest.42 Social re-
sponsibility theorists believe that government in-
tervention is warranted when powerful, concen-
trated media fail to serve their role as informers of
the electorate. 43 Neoliberals, as adherents to so-
cial responsibility theory are called, tend to be
concerned with abuses by corporations and other
nongovernmental entities, while libertarians are
concerned with abuses by government.44 A lead-
ing twentieth-century criticism of the press was
that it "wielded its enormous power for its own
ends."45 In a social responsibility scheme, the state
is ultimately responsible for press performance.
This theory, too, has been deemed outmoded, as
technological advances have reduced the press'
importance as an information source. 46 Nonethe-
less, the theory is manifested in commercial
speech regulation, obscenity law, and regulation
of electronic media.47
Helle has attempted to reconcile libertarian
and social responsibility theory under a single ap-
proach to newsgathering law. By granting greater
protection to publication than to newsgathering,
the U.S. Supreme Court, Helle contends, has "im-
plicit[ly] sanction[ed]" the notion that govern-
ment has a right to deny information to the peo-
ple. 48 Instead, Helle proposes a newsgathering
right based on the "presumption that the govern-
ment has no right not to speak;"49 that also has "a
duty to communicate information within its pos-
session."5 0 Under this approach, "the private in-
terests of the press are maintained in accordance
with libertarian theory, and the government as-
sumes the duty of acting in the public interest in
accordance with social responsibility theory."5 1
Supp. 1282, 1287 (N.D. I11. 1986).
4o1 Littleton, supra note 6, at 26.
41 Helle, supra note 19, at 20.
42 Id. at 20-22.
43 Id. at 22-23.
44 BERRY, supra note 26, at 91.
45 SIEBERT ET AL.., supra note 17, at 78.
41 BERRY, supra note 26, at 108-09.
47 Helle, supra note 19, at 32.
48 Id. at 3.





This paper argues that, even under Helle's anal-
ysis of a strong newsgathering right, ride-along re-
porting does not pass muster under the First
Amendment. Such reporting violates the check-
ing value that underlies libertarian theory because
the press is in collusion with the very institution it
is supposed to monitor. Previous scholarship has
argued that the nature of the ride-along-the me-
dia in cooperation with government officials-
compromises the press in its watchdog role.52
This paper will support that argument.
One plaintiff aptly called the ride-along an "un-
holy alliance. '53 Ride-alongs also violate social re-
sponsibility theory because, as the case analysis be-
low will show, they do not involve government in-
formation in the strictest sense, such as docu-
ments or official proceedings. 54 , Instead, ride-
alongs stem from situations, such as the execution
of a search warrant at a private home, in which
the government itself has limited authority to be
present. Ride-alongs, therefore, result in the
press providing contaminated information to the
public, in violation of its social responsibility. 55
Media ride-alongs represent the abuse of both
corporate media power and government power to
the detriment of individuals. They pit individual
privacy and property interests against colluding
government and corporate media interests. By
looking at the individual interest threatened in
each ride-along case, we can arrive at a more con-
sistent and appropriate analysis of these cases.
II. PERSPECTIVES ON RIDE-ALONGS
This paper offers a comprehensive survey of the
law of ride-along reporting, and places it within
the framework of First Amendment law. Previous
legal analysis of ride-alongs can be divided into
two broad categories-articles examining consti-
tutional claims and articles examining tort law
claims. Across the breadth of this work, commen-
tators generally found ride-alongs problematic
from legal and ethical perspectives. Two key
52 See Elsa Y. Ransom, Home: No Place for "Law Enforcement
Theatricals " - The Outlawing of Police/Media Home Invasions in
Ayeni v. Mottola, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 325, 356-57
(1995). See also Middleton, supra note 4, at 294; Randall P.
Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REv. 731,
735 (1977).
53 Jones v. Taibbi, 508 F. Supp. 1069, 1073 (D. Mass.
1981) (quoting Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment).
54 Helle, supra note 19, at 52 (explaining that propo-
themes emerged. First, ride-alongs do not serve
First Amendment values because they raise ethical
concerns for participants-the press cannot serve
as a watchdog because it is essentially colluding
with the government when it rides along, which
violates libertarian theory. Second, ride-alongs are
frequently viewed as a means for building audi-
ence share rather than fostering democracy. This
violates social responsibility theory, which re-
quires the press to provide information for self-
governance, not for entertainment.
A. Constitutional Claims Focusing on the
Fourth Amendment
Scholarship on constitutional claims has con-
centrated on the Fourth Amendment, examining
both media and official liability. Fourth Amend-
ment claims typically arise when the media accom-
panies law enforcement officers who are execut-
ing a warrant. Professor Elsa Y. Ransom, a former
television news producer, argued that the First
Amendment privilege to gather news stopped
short of supporting many ride-alongs. 56 Ransom
asserted that,"[t] here is no tradition of public ac-
cess to the interior of a private dwelling and no
essential role played by such access in the proper
functioning of the criminal justice system that
would justify press invasion of a private home."57
Ransom acknowledged that some might favor
ride-alongs on the ground that the press acts as a
watchdog on government58-the libertarian argu-
ment. But she disagreed with that argument, ex-
plaining that, "the effectiveness of the media in
scrutinizing the conduct of law enforcement per-
sonnel may be greatly compromised given the po-
tentially collusive and non-spontaneous nature of
the joint enterprise."59 Another commentator,
taking a social responsibility perspective on me-
dia-police collaborations, proposed that the
judge's ruling on the warrant determine whether
the value of the ride-along to society outweighed
the suspect's privacy interest. 60 Other authors us-
nents of a newsgathering right most often seek to gather gov-
ernmental expression).
55 Id. at 22.
56 Ransom, supra note 52, at 325, 353-54.
57 Id. at 355.
58 Id. at 356.
59 Id.
60 John P. Cronan, Subjecting the Fourth Amendment to Inter-
mediate Scrutiny: The Reasonableness of Media Ride-Alongs, 17
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 949 (1999).
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ing a social responsibility perspective were much
more critical of the media, arguing that ride-
alongs were driven by their quest for audience
share and profits rather than by their devotion to
democracy. 6' One of them deemed such ride-
alongs per se violations of the Fourth Amendment
and stated that courts should "refuse to let search
warrants be used by the media as general admis-
sion tickets to the homes and lives of private citi-
zens."
62
The television industry itself has provided am-
ple evidence that reality TV is more about good
business than good democracy. "Broad-based
demographics make reality shows popular with
packaged goods manufacturers trying to sell fro-
zen food and other staples to two-income fami-
lies," according to one industry publication.
63
One popular reality show, "Real Stories of the
Highway Patrol," is produced by Genesis En-
tertainment. The company's chief executive,
Wayne Lepoff, credited its success to its combina-
tion of live footage and reenactments, saying,
"People like the ride-alongs, but we find viewer in-
terest in re-enactments holds audiences even bet-
ter."
64
Scholars discussing official liability in media
ride-alongs found the practice problematic for
the authorized officials executing the warrant.
Kevin E. Lunday, a U.S. Coast Guard lieutenant,
commenting before the U.S. Supreme Court's de-
cision in Wilson v. Layne65 was handed down,
urged the federal government to develop a consis-
tent policy for determining when it is permissible
for the media to accompany officials in federal
searches.6 6 He argued that such a policy should
take into account the expectation of privacy in the
location to be searched, explaining that a private
home would carry a high expectation of privacy. 67
Other writers discussing official liability flatly
opposed ride-alongs. One rejected the type of
61 Brad M. Johnston, The Media's Presence During the Execu-
tion of a Search Warrant: A Per Se Violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1499 (1997); Christopher A. Rothe,
Note: The Legal Future of "Reality" Cop Shows: Parker v. Boyer
Dismisses § 1983 Claims Against Police Officers and Television Sta-
tion Jointly Engaged in Searches of Homes, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 481 (1998).
62 Johnston, supra note 61, at 1533-34.
63 Cynthia Littleton, Reality Television: Keeping the Heat On,
BROAD. & CABLE, May 20, 1996, at 25.
64 Tobenkin, supra note 5, at 17.
65 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
66 Kevin E. Lunday, Note: Permitting Media Participation in
Federal Searches: Exploring the Consequences for the United States
balancing test proposed by Lunday, arguing that
it eroded the Fourth Amendment's imperative to
control the police.68 Another said that allowing
the media to accompany authorized officials who
are executing a warrant made a search unreasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment.69 Still another
claimed that ride-alongs violated the sanctity of
the home. 71 1
B. Tort Law Claims
Scholarship examining tort law claims arising
from ride-along reporting has focused on trespass
and privacy claims. Here, too, commentators have
voiced little support for the ride-along, even those
who one might expect to be sympathetic to the
media, such as journalism professor Kent R. Mid-
dleton. In a 1989 article, Middleton argued that
journalists did not have a legal privilege to accom-
pany officials into private homes, despite the "cus-
tom and usage" rationale articulated by the Flor-
ida Supreme Court in Florida Publishing Co. v.
Fletcher.7 1 Middleton, focusing on whether there
existed a journalistic privilege to trespass, also
claimed that the "newsgathering values served by
such journalists engaged are not sufficient to jus-
tify the violation of a homeowner's property and
privacy interests protected by the law of the tres-
pass."'7 2 He emphasized the weakness of arguing
for the right to gather news, and the lack of his-
torical support for extending a newsgatherer's
right of access to a private home.7 3
Middleton also briefly discussed ethical con-
cerns raised by ride-alongs. Echoing libertarian
theory, he noted that it "is difficult for the jour-
nalists to maintain the role of independent re-
porter, or government adversary, when they rou-
tinely rely on official custom to enter private
homes. '7 4 Other scholars have examined the no-
tion of a newsgathering privilege for journalists
Following Ayeni v. Mottola and a Framework for Analysis, 65
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 278 (1997).
67 Id. at 306.
68 Bond, supra note 4.
69 Sally S. Campbell, Lights, Cameras, Access: Should the Po-
lice Provide the Means for Television Stations to Violate the Fourth
Amendment?, 22 U. DAYrON L. REV. 351, 352 (1997).
70 Tourtillott, supra note 4.
71 Middleton, supra note 4, at 260-62, 269, 274-75 (dis-
cussing Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So.2d 914 (Fla.
1976)).
72 Id. at 262.
7- Id. at 280.
74 Id. at 294.
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who trespass on private property, but not specifi-
cally within the context of a ride-along.75 Efforts
to establish such a privilege have been unsuccess-
ful. 76 Finally, Middleton warned that journalists
who ride along may face liability for intrusion and
civil rights violations.7 7 Indeed, they have. As this
paper demonstrates, many of the legal claims aris-
ing from ride-alongs in recent years have stated
these causes of action.
In the realm of privacy law, one author ex-
amined the viability of these tort claims as a re-
sponse to a media ride-along, or to other intrusive
newsgathering techniques commonly practiced by
so-called "tabloid television."78 The author argued
that despite the First Amendment and broad defi-
nitions of newsworthiness, privacy torts can be via-
ble causes of action in claims against tabloid tele-
vision, in large part because its programming is
not "news."'79 This is considered a social responsi-
bility-oriented analysis. Another author also dis-
cussed ride-along journalism and the right to pri-
vacy using Wilson v. Layne as the focal point.8 0
Journalists and journalism scholars have been di-
vided on whether the practice is journalistically
75 See, e.g., David F. Freedman, Note, Press Passes and Tres-
passes: Newsgathering on Private Property, 84 Cot uM. L. REv.
1298 (1984). See also Note, And Forgive Them Their Trespasses:
Applying the Defense of Necessity to the Criminal Conduct of the
Newsgatherer, 103 HARV. L. REV. 890 (1990).
76 See generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying and
Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do
About It, 73 TUL. L. REv. 173, 194 n.100 (1998).
77 Middleton, supra note 4, at 286-293.
78 Eduardo W. Gonzalez, "Get That Camera Out of My
Face!" An Examination of the Viability of Suing "Tabloid Televi-
sion"for Invasion of Privacy, 51 U. MIAMI L. RE'V. 935 (1997).
79 Id. at 947-48.
8o Tourtillott, supra note 4.
81 See generally Gary L. Bostwick, The Newsworthiness Ele-
ment: Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc. Muddies the Waters, 19
Lov. L.A. EN-I. L. REx. 225 (1999) (discussing the California
Supreme Court's definition of the newsworthiness element
in the private facts tort as articulated in Shulman v. Group W
Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998)).
82 See generally Bond, supra note 4; Eric B. Easton, Two
Wrongs Mock a Right: Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta That Bar
First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 OHIo ST. L.J.
1135 (1997); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying and Lying:
Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should do About It, 73
TUL. L. REV. 173 (1998).
83 See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 511, 515.
84 Id. at 511.
85 Id. at 512.
86 E.g., Clay Calvert, Toxic Television, Editorial Discretion &
The Public Interest: A Rocky Mountain Low, 21 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 163, 200 (1998).
87 This study is limited to published opinions from state
and federal courts since 1971, the year in which Dietemann v.
sound."'
Many commentators perceived a dichotomy be-
tween news and entertainment.82 Courts also drew
a distinction in their opinions between news and
entertainment.8 3 Courts sometimes viewed the
work of the press as less worthy of First Amend-
ment protection when coverage seemed to be en-
tertainment rather than news. 4 In such instances,
the press was seen as straying from its role as in-
former of the electorate.8 5 Some scholars, how-
ever, have been sharply critical of government at-
tempts to distinguish news from entertainment,
asserting that news is a social construct that gov-
ernment has no business defining. 86 This paper
will argue that the news/entertainment dichot-
omy is spurious.
III. CAUSES OF ACTION
Ride-along reporting has spawned lawsuits
based on an assortment of claims.8 7 The most
common causes of action are based on the tort of
privacy: intrusion,"8 appropriation,"9 false light 9
Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971)-the earliest identi-
fied ride-along case-was decided by the Ninth Circuit of the
U.S. Court of Appeals. A total of fifty cases dealing with ride-
alongs are identified in this paper. Because "ride-along re-
porting" is not a category used in legal digests, and because
the term is not always used in legal opinions involving the
activity, case identification involved several steps. Cases were
first identified using the index to Media Law Reporter. These
cases were then used to compile a list of the causes of action
that gave rise to claims of ride-along reporting. Appropriate
key numbers in West's Decennial Digests and General Digests
were then consulted for additional cases. Also used to iden-
tify cases was the casebook C. THOMAS DIENES ET AL., NEWS-
GATHERING AND THE LAW 578-82 (1999), and citations in al-
ready-identified court opinions.
88 See, e.g., Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F.
Supp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes,
Inc., 893 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Baugh v. CBS,
Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Huskey v. Nat'l
Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Il. 1986); Pierson v.
News Group Publ'ns, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982);
Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998);
Penwell v. Taft Broad. Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984) [hereinafter Intrusion Cases].
89 See, e.g., Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F.
Supp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers,
Inc., 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Baugh v.
CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Pierson v. News
Group Publ'ns, Inc. 549 F. Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Delan
v. CBS, Inc., 458 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
90 See, e.g., Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F.
Supp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes,
Inc., 893 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Hagler v. Demo-
crat-News, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Pierson
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and private facts,' I with a single case often includ-
ing more than one of these privacy torts. A close
second is violation of the plaintiff's civil rights,
9 2
particularly the Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.9 5
Other common claims are trespass, 9 4 intentional
v. News Group Publ'ns, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga.
1982); Stern v. OfficerJohn Doe, 806 So. 2d 98 (La. Ct. App.
2001); Diaz v. Univision Television Group, Inc., 29 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2245 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Magenis v.
Fisher Broad., Inc., 798 P.2d 1106 (Or. Ct. App. 1990);
Penwell v. Taft Broad. Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984).
91 See, e.g., Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F.
Supp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes,
Inc., 893 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Baugh v. CBS,
Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Huskey v. Nat'l
Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Pierson v.
News Group Publ'ns, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982);
Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998);
Diaz v. Univision Television Group, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2245 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Penwell v. Taft
Broad. Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) [hereinaf-
ter Private Fact Cases].
92 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Bru-
nette v. Humane Soc'y of Ventura County, 294 F.3d 1205
(9th Cir. 2002); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir.
1997); Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Stack v.
Killian, 96 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 1996); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d
680 (2d Cir. 1994); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245
(9th Cir. 1971); Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 142 F.
Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Lyde v. New York City, 145 F.
Supp. 2d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Robinson v. City of Philadel-
phia, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1317 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Lauro v.
New York City, 39 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Nichols v.
Hendrix, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1503 (N.D. Ga. 1999);
Swate v.Taylor, 12 F. Supp. 2d 591 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Hicks v.
Cassilly, 971 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1997); Barrett v. Outlet
Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Hagler v.
Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D.
Pa. 1996); Mullins v. Bookman, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2374 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Ayeni v. CBS Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362
(E.D.N.Y. 1994); Jones/Seymour v. LeFebvre, 19 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2064 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Moncrief v. Hanton, 782
F.2d 1042 (1985); Jones v. Taibbi, 508 F. Supp. 1069 (D.
Mass. 1981); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 502 F. Supp. 1159
(D. Md. 1980); Avenson v. Zegart, 577 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn.
1984); Smith v. Fairman, 98 F.R.D. 445 (C.D. Ill. 1982);
Holman v. Central Ark. Broad. Co., 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd, 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979);
Mimms v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa.
1972); People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo. Ct. App.
1993); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App.
1980) [hereinafter Civil Rights Cases].
See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Bru-
nette v. Humane Soc'y of Ventura County, 294 F.3d 1205
(9th Cir. 2002); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir.
1997); Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Stack v.
Killian, 96 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 1996); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d
680 (2d Cir. 1994); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245
(9th Cir. 1971); Robinson v. City of Philadelphia, 30 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1317 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Lauro v. New York City, 39
F. Stipp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Nichols v. Hendrix, 27 Me-
dia L. Rep. (BNA) 1503 (N.D. Ga. 1999); Swate v. Taylor, 12
infliction of emotional distress9 5 and illegal elec-
tronic surveillance.9 6
In every case, no matter what the cause of ac-
tion, the media used photographic or audio
equipment. A majority of the claims arose from
the presence of television crews,97 and most of the
F. Supp. 2d 591 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Barrett v. Outlet Broad.,
Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Hagler v. Phila.
Newspapers, Inc., 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa.
1996); Ayeni v. CBS Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994);
Moncrief v. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1620 (N.D.
Ohio 1984); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 502 F. Supp. 1159
(D. Md. 1980); Avenson v. Zegart, 577 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn.
1984); People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo. Ct. App.
1993); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App.
1980).
94 See, e.g., Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir.
1997); Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 142 F. Supp. 2d
431 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F.
Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Reeves v. Fox Television Net-
work, 983 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Hagler v. Phila.
Newspapers, Inc., 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa.
1996); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993);
Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986); Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976);
Green Valley Sch., Inc. v. Cowles Fla. Broad., Inc., 327 So. 2d
810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Nichols v. Ga. Television Co.,
552 S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Belluomo v. KAKE TV &
Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d 832 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979); Anderson v.
WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Carr v.
Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App.
1980) [hereinafter Trespass Cases].
95 See, e.g., Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir.
1997); Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D.
Ohio 1997); Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp.
703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Crowley v. Fox Broad. Co., 851 F.
Supp. 700 (D. Md. 1994); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp.
745 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal.
Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes,
Inc., 893 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
96 See, e.g., Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir.
1997); Brown v. Am. Broad. Co., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir.
1983); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 554 F. Supp. 145 (D. Md.
1982); Holman v. Central Ark. Broad. Co., 4 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affid, 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir.
1979).
97 See Brunette v. Humane Soc'y of Ventura County, 294
F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2002); Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d
Cir. 2000); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997);
Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Stack v. Killian,
96 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 1996); Brown v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc.,
704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir. 1983); Robinson v. City of Philadel-
phia, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1317 (E.D. Pa. 2001);
Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 142 F. Supp. 2d 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Lyde v. New York City., 145 F. Supp. 2d 350
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Nichols v. Hendrix, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1503 (N.D. Ga. 1999); Swate v. Taylor, 12 F. Supp. 2d 591
(S.D. Tex. 1998); Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp.
2d 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Hicks v. Cassilly, 971 F. Supp. 956
(D. Md. 1997); Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F.
Supp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Mullins v. Bookman, 23 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 2374 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848
F. Supp 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Crowley v. Fox Broad. Co., 851
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cases, including the case that went to the U.S. Su-
preme Court,98 involved newspaper or magazine
photographers as well.' 9' No case was found in
which someone sued over the presence of a re-
porter unaccompanied by a photographer.
Ride-along reporting also has led journalists to
invoke shield laws. 00 In these cases, the journalist
typically witnessed an arrest, 1° 1 or the execution
of a search warrant. 10 2 The person who was ar-
rested or whose property was searched then faced
criminal charges. In preparing a criminal de-
fense, the accused tried to compel the reporter-
witness to testify about the arrest or compel a
broadcast station to hand over footage shot dur-
ing the search. Journalists and news organizations
sought to avoid testifying or providing video by in-
voking reporter's privilege. In contrast to the
other ride-along claims, in which plaintiffs argued
that the journalist had ventured somewhere or ob-
tained some information that was off limits, these
cases involved an attempt to obtain information
that the journalist did not want to provide. Thus,
the shield-law cases are not analyzed here.
A. Civil Rights Violations
More than half the opinions identified for this
F. Supp. 700 (D. Md. 1994); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp.
745 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Jones/Seymour v. LeFebvre, 19 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 2064 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Huskey v. Nat'l Broad.
Co., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Moncrief v.
Hanton, 782 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir. 1985); Benford v. Am.
Broad. Co., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 145 (D. Md. 1982); Smith v.
Fairman, 98 F.R.D. 445 (C.D. Ill. 1982);Jones v. Taibbi, 508
F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1981); Higbee v. Times-Advocate,
Inc., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2372 (S.D. Cal. 1980); Shulman
v. Group W. Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998); Miller v.
Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);
People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993);
Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976); Green
Valley Sch. v. Cowles Fla. Broad., Inc., 327 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1976); Nichols v. Ga. Television Co., 552 S.E.2d 550
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc.,
596 P.2d 832 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979); Stern v. OfficerJohn Doe,
806 So. 2d 98 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Diaz v. Univision Televi-
sion Group, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2245 (N.J. Super.
2001); Rogers v. Buckel, 615 N.E.2d 669 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992); Penwell v. Taft Broad. Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1984); Haynik v. Zimlich, 508 N.E.2d 195 (Ct. C.P.
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1986); Delan v. CBS, Inc., 91
A.D.2d 255 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Anderson v. WROC-TV,
441 N.Y.S. 2d 220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1981); Magenis v. Fisher
Broad., Inc., 798 P.2d 1106 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); Carr v. Mo-
bile Video Tapes, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994);
Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980);
Holman v. Central Ark. Broad. Co., 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir.
1979); Avenson v. Zegart, 577 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn. 1984)
[hereinafter Television Camera Crew Cases].
study arose from civil rights claims. I"' Most often,
the plaintiff claimed a violation of his or her civil
rights under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S.
Code. 10 4 To recover under Section 1983, two ele-
ments are required. 10 5 First, the plaintiff must
show "that the defendant deprived him of a right
secured by the 'Constitution and laws' of the
United States."'1 6 In most of the ride-along cases,
that right was identified as the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection of citizens from unreasonable
intrusions by government officials into areas
where they have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.1 0 7 In a few cases, however, plaintiffs claimed
violation of other rights, including the right to
privacy as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 10 8 To satisfy the second prong necessary for
recovery under Section 1983, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the "defendant acted 'under
color of law' when depriving him or her of that
right." 0 9
Of the civil rights claims that failed, slightly
more failed on the first element, deprivation of a
constitutional right1 10 than on the second ele-
ment, that the defendant was acting under color
98 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
99 Id.; Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir.
1971); Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 24 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Hagler v. The Democrat-News,
Inc., 699 S.W.2d 96 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Pierson v. News Group
Publ'ns., 549 F. Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Mimms v. Phila.
Newspapers, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Ga. 1972).
100 E.g., United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149
(E.D.N.Y. 1992); Delaney v. Los Angeles County, 789 P.2d
934 (Cal. 1990); People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1993); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Morejon, 561 So.
2d 577 (Fla. 1990).
101 See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d
577 (Fla. 1990).
102 See United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149
(E.D.N.Y. 1992).
103 See Civil Rights Cases, supra note 92.
104 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2000).
105 SeeJones v. Taibbi, 508 F. Supp. 1069, 1072 (D. Mass.
1981) (explaining that there are two elements necessary in a
§1983 claim).
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967).
108 Mullins v. Bookman, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2374
(N.D. Ga. 1995).
109 See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970) (discussing the second element required under a
§1983 claim).
110 See Stack v. Killian, 96 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 1996);
Jones/Seymour v. LeFebvre, 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2064
[Vol. 12
Media Ride-Alongs
of law.''' Courts were divided as to whether the
media were acting under color of law in the ride-
along cases. Most of the time, they held that the
media were not acting under color of law.' 12 In
three cases, however, courts held that they were
acting inder color of law.'" In one of these
three, the court accepted the media's own claim
that they were acting under color of law.' '
4
The vast majority of civil rights claims stemmed
from an incident at a private home or other prop-
erty with limited accessibility to the public,' 15 in-
cluding five cases filed by people who were incar-
cerated when the offending incident occurred. 116
Although courts generally were not sympathetic
to the inmates, they were sympathetic to plaintiffs
whose private homes had been invaded by the me-
dia. The best illustration of this point was pro-
vided by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Wilson v. Layne.' 17 Writing for a unanimous court,
Chief Justice Rehnquist outlined centuries of En-
glish law that established the sanctity of the
home.' 1 After citing a seventeenth-century court
decision that referred to the home as one's "castle
and fortress," 119 and Blackstone's eighteenth-cen-
tury Commentaries on the Laws of England, stating
that the law "will never suffer [the home] to be
violated with impunity,"'12" Rehnquist continued:
(E.D. Pa. 1992); Avenson v. Zegart, 577 F. Supp. 958 (D.
Minn. 1984); Moncrief v. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1620 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Benford v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 502
F. Supp. 1159 (D. Md. 1980); Holman v. Central Ark. Broad.
Co., 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd, 601
F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979); Mimms v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc.,
352 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972); People v. Henderson, 847
P.2d 239 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295
N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
111 Brunette v. Humane Soc'y of Ventura County, 294
F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2002); Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th
Cir. 1996); Robinson v. City of Philadelphia, 30 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1317 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Nichols v. Hendrix, 27 Me-
dia L. Rep. (BNA) 1503 (N.D. Ga. 1999); Mullins v. Book-
man, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2374 (N.D. Ga. 1995);Jones v.
Taibbi, 508 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1981).
112 Ayeni v. CBS, 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd
by Ayeni v. Mottola, 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994);Jones
v. Taibbi, 508 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1981); Mimms v. Phila.
Newspapers, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Mullins v.
Bookman, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2374 (N.D. Ga. 1995);
Nichols v. Hendrix, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1503 (N.D. Ga.
1999); Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Prahl v.
Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
113 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 514-16 (9th Cir.
1997); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir.
1971); Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726, 736
(S.D. Ohio 1997).
114 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir.
1971).
The Fourth Amendment embodies this centuries-old
principle of respect for the privacy of the home ....
Our decisions have applied these basic principles of the
Fourth Amendment to situations, like the one in this
case, in which police enter a home tinder the authority
of an arrest warrant in order to take into custody the
suspect named in the warrant.'1'
Lower courts showed similar sympathy for
plaintiffs whose homes had been invaded by po-
lice accompanied by the media. In Ayeni v. CBS, a
woman was clad only in a dressing gown when Se-
cret Service agents accompanied by a television
crew burst into her home and videotaped her
young son crying behind the couch.' 2 2 The dis-
trict court stated, "CBS had no greater right than
that of a thief to be in the home, to take pictures,
and to remove the photographic record.' 23 The
woman also brought a lawsuit against the Secret
Service agents, in which a federal appeals court
explained, "A private home is not a soundstage
for law enforcement theatricals."' 12 4 In a case filed
by another woman whose home was invaded by
police and newspaper photographers who took
pictures of her underwear-clad children, the court
stated, "A search warrant is simply not a press
pass."12 5
Government officials in these cases included
police,' 2 6 Secret Service agents, 12 7 members of a
115 Cases not arising from an incident at a home were
Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 142 F. Stipp. 2d 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (involving a public perp walk); Lyde v. New
York City, 145 F. Supp. 2d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (focusing on
public perp walk); Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir.
2000) (involving a public perp walk); Swate v. Taylor, 12 F.
Stipp. 2d 591 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (involving a methadone
clinic); Hicks v. Cassilly, 971 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1997) (in-
volving a bookstore); People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239
(Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (focusing on a flyover);Jones v. Taibbi,
508 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1981).
116 Mullins v. Bookman, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2374
(N.D. Ga. 1995); Jones/Seymour v. LeFebvre, 19 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2064 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Smith v. Fairman, 98
F.R.D. 445 (C.D. 111. 1982); Holman v. Central Ark. Broad.
Co., 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd, 610
F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979); Mimms v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc.,
352 F. Stipp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
117 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
118 Id. at 605, 609-10.
'"9 Id. at 609.
1201 Id. at 610.
121 M.
122 Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994),
affd by Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d. 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1994).
123 Id. at 368.
124 Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d. 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1994).
125 Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 24 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2332, 2334 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
121) Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000); Parker
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congressional investigatory team, 128 agents from
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 12 9 district attor-
neys, 0 prison wardens, 3 Humane Society of-
ficers, 132 U.S. marshals,133 a state Department of
Agriculture official134 and a Drug Enforcement
Agency officer. 13 5 Nor were police the only offi-
cials to execute warrants. Mistreatment of ani-
mals was the most common reason for non-police
officials to execute a warrant. These included a
Humane Society official investigating a puppy
mill, 13 6 a state department of agriculture official
investigating an animal shelter, 137 and an investi-
gation by U.S. Fish and Wildlife agents.' 38
Civil rights cases in which officials were not exe-
cuting a warrant arose from a variety of situations.
Some were filed by prison inmates who objected
to being filmed or photographed by the media.13'
Others were similar to the warrant cases in that
officials investigating a crime cooperated with the
media. 140 For example, police flew in a television
station's helicopter over the residence of a sus-
pected marijuana grower, and the TV station was
able to videotape the scene from the helicop-
ter. 41
Even when officials were not executing a war-
v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Holman v. Central Ark.
Broad. Co., 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979),
affd, 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979); Caldarola v. County of
Westchester, 142 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Lyde v.
New York City, 145 F. Supp. 2d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Nichols
v. Hendrix, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1503 (N.D. Ga. 1999);
Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio
1997); Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 24 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2332, 2334 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Moncrief v. Hanton, 782
F.2d 1042 (1985); Jones v. Taibbi, 508 F. Supp. 1069 (D.
Mass. 1981); People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1993); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1980).
127 Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994),
affd by Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d. 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1994).
128 Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 502 F. Supp. 1159 (D.
Md. 1980).
129 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997), va-
cated, Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999).
130 See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th
Cir. 1971); Hicks v. Cassilly, 971 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1997)
(involving an agreement between media and the Los Angeles
District Attorney's Office whereby the media were given per-
mission by the D.A.'s office to visit the plaintiff).
131 Mullins v. Bookman, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2374
(N.D. Ga. 1995); Jones/Seymour v. LeFebvre, 19 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2064 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Smith v. Fairman, 98
F.R.D. 445 (C.D. I11. 1982); Mimms v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc.,
352 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
132 Brunette v. Humane Soc'y of Ventura County, 294
F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2002).
'33 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
134 Stack v. Killian, 96 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 1996).
rant, courts still were mindful about limiting the
coercive power of the police. An example was
Barrett v. Outlet Broadcasting, the case that arose
from a 9-1-1 call reporting a self-inflicted gunshot
wound. 142 The court ruled that the police were
justified in entering the plaintiffs home, "and as
such the police were temporarily placed in con-
trol of the premises."'143 But, the court explained
that it was not permissible for police to allow a
news crew into a private residence without placing
limits on the crew's conduct. 144
Police coercion in the absence of a warrant
took place in public as well as private places. For
instance, Lauro v. Charles arose from a "perp
walk,"1 45 which is a police officer's slang for pa-
rading an arrestee outside the precinct upon re-
quest from the media. 146 The Second Circuit held
that the perp walk violated the plaintiffs Fourth
Amendment rights. 147 The police had taken the
plaintiff outside the police station for a perp walk
because the media were interested in the case. 148
The court emphasized that such a perp walk was a
"staged recreation of [an] event ... an inherently
fictional dramatization of an event that transpired
135 Swate v. Taylor, 12 F. Supp. 2d 591 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
136 Avenson v. Zegart, 577 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn. 1984).
137 Stack v. Killian, 96 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 1996).
138 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997).
139 E.g., Mullins v. Bookman, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2374 (N.D. Ga. 1995);Jones/Seymour v. LeFebrve, 19 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 2064 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Smith v. Fairman, 98
F.R.D. 445 (C.D. I11. 1982); Mimms v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc.,
352 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
140 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cli.
1971) (involving the magazine staff accompanying the dis-
trict attorney's office to investigate an alleged medical
quack); Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 142 F. Supp. 2d
431 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (involving a perp walk); Lyde v. New
York City, 145 F. Supp 2d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (involving a
perp walk); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 502 F. Supp. 1159
(D. Md. 1980) (highlighting a television crew surreptitiously
taping congressional questioning of an insurance salesman
suspected of wrongdoing); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d
768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (involving a television crew accom-
panying a SWAT team as it responded to a report of shots
being fired at several boys).
141 People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo. Ct. App.
1993).
142 Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726, 731
(S.D. Ohio 1997).
143 Id. at 737.
144 Id. at 739.
145 Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000).
146 Id. at 203 (explaining that "perp" is a police officer's
slang for "perpetrator").




hours earlier."'14' The "staged" nature of the event
meant it did not effectively serve the legitimate
state interest in accurate reporting of police activ-
ity. 15" However, the court ultimately decided the
case in favor of the defendant police officer, hold-
ing that he was entitled to qualified immunity be-
cause, as the court explained, it had not been
clearly established at the time of the 1995 perp
walk that such activity was unconstitutional. 15'
In subsequent Fourth Amendment claims aris-
ing from perp walks, courts continued to com-
ment on the coercive and humiliating nature of
the activity. One such claim ultimately failed be-
cause it was not a staged event; police were legiti-
mately transporting a suspect from the police sta-
tion to a courthouse for arraignment. 15 2 But an-
other perp walk claim, in which a police officer
and the city of New York were both defendants,
went forward on the claim against the city.' 5 3 Al-
though the officer involved was deemed to have
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 216.
152 Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 142 F. Supp. 2d
431, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
15 Lyde v. New York City, 145 F. Supp. 2d 350 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
154 Id. at 354.
155 Id. at 355.
156 Id. at 354-55.
157 See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th
Cir. 1971) (involving a magazine); Nichols v. Hendrix, 27
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1503 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (involving televi-
sion); Mullins v. Bookman, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2374
(N.D. Ga. 1995) (involving television);Jones v. Taibbi, 508 F.
Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1981) (involving television).
158 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (involv-
ing federal marshals); Stack v. Killian, 96 F.3d 159 (6th Cir.
1996) (concerning a state agriculture department official);
Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 142 F. Supp. 2d 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (involving the police and state Department
of Corrections); Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir.
2000) (involving police); Swate v. Taylor, 12 F. Supp. 2d 591
(S.D. Tex. 1998) (concerning Drug Enforcement Agency of-
ficials); Hicks v. Cassilly, 971 F.Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1997)
(concerning the district attorney); Hagler v. Phila. Newspa-
pers, Inc., 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(concerning the police);Jones/Seymour v. LeFebvre, 19 Me-
dia L. Rep. (BNA) 2064 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (concerning a prison
official); Avenson v. Zegart, 577 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn. 1984)
(involving a Humane Society officer); Smith v. Fairman, 98
F.R.D. 445 (C.D. Il. 1982) (concerning a prison warden);
People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (in-
volving the police).
159 See, e.g., Brunette v. Humane Soc'y of Ventura
County, 294 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2002) (involving television
and Humane Society officers); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d
505 (9th Cir. 1997) (concerning television and U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service officers); Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th
Cir. 1996) (involving television and the police); Lyde v. New
qualified immunity, 15 4 the claim survived the
city's motion to dismiss. 155 The plaintiff had a
chance to show whether his Fourth Amendment
right was violated as a result of a municipal policy,
and there was evidence that perp walks were in-
deed a common police practice in the city. 5 ,
Some civil rights cases claimed media liabil-
ity, l1 7 some claimed official liability, 15 and some
claimed both.'15 Plaintiffs claiming official liabil-
ity generally found a more sympathetic ear in
court than did those claiming media liability, as
illustrated by the Court's decision in Wilson v.
Layne.11 When considering media liability, courts
have generally held that the media were not act-
ing under color of law, 16 or had not violated a
constitutional right. 6 2 But, when considering
claims of official liability, courts are more likely to
find a violation or a potential violation of a consti-
tutional right. 163
Plaintiffs in the civil rights claims fell into three
York City, 145 F. Supp. 2d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (involving tel-
evision and police); Robinson v. City of Philadelphia, 30 Me-
dia L. Rep. (BNA) 1317 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (taking issue with
television and police); Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F.
Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (concerning television and
the police); Ayeni v. CBS Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y.
1994), affd sub nom. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir.
1994) (taking issue with television and the Secret Service);
Moncrief v. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1620 (N.D.
Ohio 1984) (concerning television and the police); Benford
v. Am. Broad. Co., 554 F. Supp. 145 (D. Md. 1982) (involving
television and congressional staff); Holman v. Central Ark.
Broad. Co., 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979),
affd, 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979) (involving radio and the
police); Mimms v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 862
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (concerning newspaper and a prison offi-
cial); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980)
(taking issue with television and the police).
160 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
161 See, e.g., Brunette v. Humane Soc'y of Ventura
County, 294 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2002); Parker v. Boyer, 93
F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Nichols v. Hendrix, 27 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1503 (N.D. Ga. 1999); Mullins v. Bookman, 23
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2374 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Jones v. Taibbi,
508 F. Supp 1069 (D. Mass. 1981); Mimms v. Phila. Newspa-
pers, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Prahl v.
Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
162 See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Philadelphia, 30 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1317 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Moncrief v. Hanton, 10
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1620 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Benford v.
Am. Broad. Cos., 554 F. Supp. 145 (D. Md. 1982); Holman v.
Central Ark. Broad. Co., 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2300 (E.D.
Ark. 1979), affd, 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979).
163 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Lauro
v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000); Berger v. Hanlon,
129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997); Swate v. Taylor, 12 F. Supp. 2d
591 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F.
Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers,
Inc., 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Ayeni v.
CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), affd sub nor.
2004]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
broad categories. More than half were people sus-
pected of wrongdoing;1 64 the rest were evenly di-
vided between incarcerated individuals' 65 and in-
nocent bystanders. 16 6 The courts had a sympa-
thetic ear for most of the innocent bystander
plaintiffs. 167 They were sympathetic to only one of
the five incarcerated plaintiffs. 168 And, the courts
were sympathetic to suits filed by suspects when
official liability was claimed. 169 In general, the
courts have appeared sensitive to limiting the co-
ercive powers of the police.
Similarly, noting that the Washington Post did
not publish its photographs of the event, the
Court in Wilson v. Layne focused on the intrusive
aspect of the ride-along, not on the publica-
tion. 1 70 The Court wrote that petitioner Charles
Wilson was "dressed only in a pair of briefs" and
petitioner Geraldine Wilson was "wearing only a
nightgown" when officers and the media entered
their home. 171 Other courts, too, discussed the in-
dignities faced by some of these plaintiffs during
the ride-along. For instance, in Ayeni v. Mottola,
plaintiff Tawa Ayeni was "clad in a dressing
Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994); Smith v. Fair-
man, 98 F.R.D. 445 (C.D. Ill. 1982).
164 Brunette v. Human Soc'y of Ventura County, 294
F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2002); Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d
Cir. 2000); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997);
Stack v. Killian, 96 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 1996); Dietemann v.
Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Robinson v. City of
Philadelphia, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1317 (E.D. Pa. 2001);
Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 142 F. Supp. 2d 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Lyde v. New York City, 145 F. Supp. 2d 350
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Swate v. Taylor, 12 F. Supp. 2d 591 (S.D.
Tex. 1998); Nichols v. Hendrix, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1503 (N.D. Ga. 1999); Hicks v. Cassilly, 971 F. Supp. 956 (D.
Md. 1997); Avenson v. Zegart, 577 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn.
1984); Moncrief v. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1620
(N.D. Ohio 1984); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 502 F. Supp.
1159 (D. Md. 1980); Jones v. Taibbi, 508 F. Supp. 1069 (D.
Mass. 1981); People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1993); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1980).
165 Mullins v. Bookman, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2374
(N.D. Ga. 1995); Jones/Seymour v. LeFebvre, 19 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2064 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Smith v. Fairman, 98
F.R.D. 445 (C.D. II1. 1982); Holman v. Central Ark. Broad.
Co., 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Mimms v.
Phila. Newspapers Inc., 352 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
1616 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Parker v.
Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Barrett v. Outlet Broad.,
Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Hagler v. Phila.
Newspapers, Inc., 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa.
1996); Ayeni v. CBS Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994),
affd sub nom. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
167 See Barrett v. Outlet Broad. Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726
(S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that media and police violated
plaintiffs civil rights); Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 24
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (declaring that
gown." 172 Similarly, the children of the plaintiff in
Hagler v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., were photo-
graphed "wearing nothing but their underwear,"
and the photos were published in a local newspa-
per.17 3 The court has responded to these con-
cerns of invasion of privacy. In Lauro, the court
stated that the controversial perp walk,
had the effect only of humiliating plaintiff, assisting the
media in sensationalizing the facts of his case, and al-
lowing [Detective] Charles to appear on television.
None of these effects qualifies as a legitimate interest of
law enforcement officers-whose legal obligation is not
to provide titillating entertainment to the public but




More than one-third of the opinions reviewed
for this study included privacy claims. Most com-
mon were claims of intrusion, 75 followed by pri-
vate facts, 17 6 false light 77 and appropriation. 178 A
few privacy claims did not fit into any of these cat-
egories. 179 Following the pattern of decisions in
police violated plaintiffs civil rights); Ayeni v. CBS Inc., 848
F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (ruling that media violated
plaintiffs civil rights), affd sub nom. Ayeni v. Mottola, 22 Me-
dia L. Rep. (BNA) 2225 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that officials
violated plaintiff's civil rights). But see Parker v. Boyer, 93
F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the media were not
acting under color of law and that the police had qualified
immunity).
168 Smith v. Fairman, 98 F.R.D. 445 (C.D. Ill. 1982) (de-
nying defendant prison warden's motion for summary judg-
ment).
169 See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997)
(dealing with media liability); Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202
(2d Cir. 2000); Swate v. Taylor, 12 F. Supp. 2d 591 (S.D. Tex.
1998).
170 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 608 (1999).
171 Id. at 607.
172 Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1994).
173 Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 24 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2332, 2333 (ED. Pa. 1996).
174 Lauro v. New York City, 39 F. Supp. 2d 351, 364
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
175 See Intrusion Cases, supra note 88.
176 See Private Fact Cases, supra note 91.
177 See False Light Cases, supra note 90.
178 See Appropriation Cases, supra note 89.
179 Brown v. Am. Broad. Cos., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir.
1983); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971);
Hicks v. Cassilly, 971 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1997);Jones/Sey-
mour v. LeFebvre, 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2064 (E.D. Pa.
1992); Higbee v. Times-Advocate, Inc., 5 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2372 (S.D. Cal. 1980); Holman v. Central Ark. Broad.,
4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd, 610 F.2d
542 (8th Cir. 1979); Mimms v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 352 F.
Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (finding a constitutional right to
privacy); Delan v. CBS, Inc., 458 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div.
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privacy cases against the media in general, plain-
tiffs in ride-along cases seldom prevailed. Of the
four privacy torts, the intrusion claims were most
likely to find a sympathetic ear in court.I"" Those
claiming public disclosure of private facts or false
light were likely to have their claims rejected.
However, generally, the appropriation claims
stemming from ride-alongs were unsuccessful,'-'
unlike appropriation claims arising from other sit-
uations. 182
C. Intrusion
Intrusion was the most frequently claimed pri-
vacy tort, figuring in half of the privacy claims.18 :3
Four of the plaintiffs in intrusion claims found a
sympathetic ear in court.' 8 4 The tort of intrusion
consists of two elements: (1) intrusion into a pri-
vate place (2) in a manner highly offensive to a
reasonable person, 185 with consent being an abso-
lute defense.' 8 6 Courts applied these criteria
when deciding the ride-along cases, with varying
results.
The case that presented the clearest illustration
of a viable intrusion claim was Shulman v. Group W
Productions, decided in 1998 by the California Su-
preme Court.8 7 The court reversed a lower
court's summary judgment in favor of a television
crew that made and broadcast an audio recording
of an accident victim's conversation with a nurse
in a medical rescue helicopter.18 8 Addressing the
first element, the expectation of privacy, the Shul-
man court compared the helicopter to an ambu-
1983).
180 See, e.g., Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282
(N.D. Ill. 1986); Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 893 S.W.2d
613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955
P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr
668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
181 Of the appropriation claims listed, five did not go for-
ward. In the sixth case, Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 24
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996), the court did not
discuss the appropriation claim.
182 See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1988); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Onassis v. Christian Dior of N.Y., Inc.,
472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). See also Jonathon
Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the
Eclipse of the Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17 CAxRozo ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 213 (1999).
183 See Intrusion Cases, supra note 88.
184 Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D.
Ill. 1986); Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 613
(Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d
lance, stating, "Although the attendance of re-
porters and photographers at the scene of an acci-
dent is to be expected, we are aware of no law or
custom permitting the press to ride in ambu-
lances or enter hospital rooms during treatment
without the patient's consent."'' 18 Addressing the
second element, the offensiveness of the intru-
sion, the court stated that the camera crew,
took calculated advantage of the patient's 'vulnerability
and confusion.' Arguably, the last thing an injured ac-
cident victim should have to worry about while being
pried from her wrecked car is that a television producer
may be recording everything she says . . . to medical
personnel for the possible edification and entertain-
ment of casual television viewers.'199
The court held that a patient in these circum-
stances is incapable of giving consent. 19 1 In addi-
tion, the court ruled that the intrusion was not
privileged even though it involved newsgather-
ing.19 2
In contrast to the law enforcement officials who
composed most of the authorized individuals in
the civil rights claims, the official in Shulman was a
nurse;'9 3 a helper, not a law enforcer. Other in-
trusion cases also involved officials who were help-
ers, including paramedics 19 4 and a victim's advo-
cate. 19 5 In another instance, the plaintiffs were
the wife and daughter of a man who had suffered
a heart attack in his bedroom.' 9 6 When
paramedics arrived to administer life-saving tech-
niques, they were accompanied by a television
crew that shot footage of the event. 19 7 NBC used
the film on its nightly news. 198
Plaintiffs in intrusion cases included crime sus-
469 (Cal. 1998); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 232 Cal. Rptr
668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
185 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652B (1977).
186 Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 757 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
187 Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal.
1998).
188 Id. at 497.
189 Id. at 490.
190 Id. at 494.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 475.
194 Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 670
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
195 Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 750 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
196 Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 670





pects, 199 an inmate, 200 bereaved family mem-
bers, 201 an accident victim 20 2 and an Army lieu-
tenant who underwent POW training.203 When
the plaintiff prevailed, the location of the offend-
ing incident was always a place traditionally inac-
cessible to the general public: the home, 20 4 a pri-
vate ranch, " 5 a medical rescue helicopter, 2°1 6 a
prison.20 7 Plaintiffs who prevailed in the intrusion
cases also had in common the fact that they were
involved with authorized officials in life-and-death
situations through uncontrollable misfortune.
The plaintiff in Shulman had little choice but to
allow the medical helicopter crew to take care of
her.208 The family in Miller called for emergency
medical help when the father suffered an appar-
ent coronary; they had no way of knowing the
paramedics would bring a TV crew into their
home.20 9
D. Private Facts
Publication of private facts was a cause of action
in eight cases.2 10 Elements of this tort are public
disclosure of a private fact that is offensive to a
reasonable person and not of legitimate public
concern. 21 1 Private facts claims typically fail be-
cause the fact is indeed newsworthy. All but one
of the private facts claims stemming from a ride-
199 Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp. 703
(N.D. Ohio 1997) (involving an assault suspect); Haynik v.
Zimlich, 30 Ohio Misc. 2d 16 (Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga Cty., Ohio,
1986) (involving suspect arrested on felony drug charges);
Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1994) (concerning an animal cruelty suspect).
200 Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1285
(N.D. Ill. 1986).
201 Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 670
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
202 Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 474
(Cal. 1998).
203 Pierson v. News Group Publ'ns, Inc., 549 F. Supp.
635, 637 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
204 Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 683
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
205 Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes, 893 S.W.2d 613, 616
(Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
206 Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 474-
75 (Cal. 1998).
207 Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1285
(N.D. Ill. 1986).
208 Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 474-
75 (Cal. 1998).
209 Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 670
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
210 Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp. 703
(N.D. Ohio 1997); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745
(N.D. Cal. 1993); Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp.
along failed on the newsworthiness prong of the
test.2 1
2
Private facts claims arose from incidents in a
bar,2 13 a private home,2 14 a prison 2 15 and a medi-
cal rescue helicopter.2 1 6 In all cases, a television
crew captured sound or footage of the plaintiff in
that location. For example, Penwell v. Taft Broad-
casting Co., decided by an Ohio appeals court in
1984, was filed by an innocent bystander in a drug
bust in a small-town bar.21 7 Plaintiff Billy Gene
Penwell, Jr. was having a drink when police or-
dered him to put his hands over his head, after
which they frisked, handcuffed, and removed him
from the bar.218 A local television station captured
the arrest on videotape and aired it on several
news programs, even though police later deter-
mined that his arrest was a case of mistaken iden-
tity. 2 19 Penwell's claim for private facts failed be-
cause of the event's newsworthiness. The court
noted that his arrest was part of the largest drug
raid in county history-a matter in which the pub-
lic had a legitimate concern.220
Other unsuccessful plaintiffs claiming this
cause of action were those in Shulman,22 1 the case
filed by the accident victim transported in the
medical rescue helicopter, and in Reeves v. Fox Tel-
evision, which was filed by a man who police, ac-
companied by a television crew, arrested in his
1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes, 893
S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Pierson v. News Group
Publ'ns, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Shulman v.
Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998); Diaz v. Univi-
sion Television Group, 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2245 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Penwell v. Taft Broad. Co., 469
N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
211 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652D (1977).
212 Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1289
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that the plaintiffs tattoo was not a
matter of public concern and therefore, not fair game for
broadcast).
213 See Penwell v. Taft Broad. Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1984).
214 See Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp.
703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Diaz v. Univision Television Group,
29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2245 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
2001).
215 See Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282
(N.D. Ill. 1986).
216 See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469
(Cal. 1998).
217 Penwell v. Taft Broad. Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025, 1027
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 1028.




own home.2 22 Also unsuccessful was the plaintiff
in Diaz v. Univision Television Group, which con-
cerned a man who was described in a television
news program as a "deadbeat dad," that is, delin-
quent in his child support payments. 22 3
The prisoner who filed Huskey v. NBC was al-
lowed to go forward with his claim because the
court agreed he was engaged in private activity
when the camera crew filmed him in the prison
exercise cage, where his distinctive tattoos were
visible. 22 4 In four private facts claims, plaintiffs
claimed that officials had coercive power: the
prison warden in Huskey,22 5 and the police in
Reeves, 2 2 6 Penwell,22 7 and Diaz.2 28
E. False Light
False light invasion of privacy is the publication
of information in a manner that places a person
in a false and offensive light. 229 Fewer and fewer
jurisdictions are recognizing false light as a sepa-
rate cause of action, distinct from defamation. 23 0
In keeping with this trend, courts rejected all but
one of the eight claims of false light filed in the
ride-along cases.23'I The one case that survived
summary judgment was Pierson v. News Group Pub-
lications, decided in 1982 by a federal district
222 Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp. 703,
707 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
223 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2245 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 2001).
224 Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 2109
(N.D. 111. 1986).
225 Id.
226 Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp. 703
(N.D. Ohio 1997).
227 Penwell v. Taft Broad. Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1984).
228 Diaz v. Univision Television Group, 29 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2245 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001).
229 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652E cmt. b
(1977)
230 See Ruth Walden and Emile Netzhammer, False Light
Invasion of Privacy: Untangling the Web of Uncertainty, 9 HAS-
TINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 347 (1987).
231 Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp. 703
(N.D. Ohio 1997); Pierson v. News Group Publ'ns, Inc., 549
F. Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers,
Inc., 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Stern v.
OfficerJohn Doe, 806 So. 2d 98 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Diaz v.
Univision Television Group, 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2245
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Penwell v. Taft Broad. Co.,
469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Magenis v. Fisher
Broad., Inc., 798 P.2d 1106 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); Carry. Mo-
bile Video Tapes, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
2-'2 Pierson v. News Group Publ'ns, 549 F. Supp. 635
court.23 2 Pierson was an Army officer who under-
went training at a military reservation.23 3 The
Army permitted a freelance photographer who
was working with a print reporter to take pictures
of the training.2 3 4 Pierson said the resulting pub-
licity made him appear weak, while the media de-
fendant claimed it made him appear superhu-
man.23 5 The court ruled that the interpretation of
the articles was a matter for the jury to decide. 2-3 '"
F. Appropriation
Appropriation is the use of someone's name or
likeness for trade or commercial purposes without
consent.2 37 Although it has become increasingly
difficult for plaintiffs to win most kinds of privacy
claims against the media, they can still sometimes
succeed with appropriation claims. 2 38 Six ride-
along cases included claims of appropriation.
Courts rejected five of the claims,2 9 and did not
reach the issue in the fifth. 2 40' The courts' ratio-
nale for rejecting the appropriation claims fell
into two groups: (1) the message at issue had a
news purpose, not just a commercial purpose;24 1
or (2) the plaintiff's name had no intrinsic com-
mercial value. 242
(S.D. Ga. 1982).
233 Id. at 637.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 642.
236 Id.
237 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §652C (1977).
238 See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1988); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Onassis v. Christian Dior of N.Y., Inc.,
472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). See also Jonathan
Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the
Eclipse of the Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17 CARnOZO ARTrS
& ENT. LJ. 213 (1999).
239 Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp. 703
(N.D. Ohio 1997); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745
(N.D. Cal. 1993); Pierson v. News Group Publ'ns, Inc., 549 F.
Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Diaz v. Univision Television
Group, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2245 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 2001); Delan v. CBS, Inc., 91 A.D.2d 255 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983).
240 Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 24 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
241 Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Stipp. 744, 755 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
242 See, e.g., Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F.
Supp. 703, 709 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Pierson v. News Group
Publ'ns, 549 F. Stipp. 635, 642 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Diaz v. Univi-
sion Television Group, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2245,
2248 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001).
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G. Other Privacy Claims
Plaintiffs who made general claims of violation
of the constitutional right to privacy did not fare
well in court.243 Such was the case for lawyer Mar-
vin Holman, the plaintiff in Holman v. Central Ar-
kansas Broadcasting, decided by a federal district
court in 1979.244 When Holman got publicly
drunk, he was placed in the city jail, where he be-
came violent and loud enough to be heard on the
street. 245 A radio announcer arrived at the jail and
attempted to interview Holman, who tried to
snatch the broadcaster's microphone.2 46 The
broadcaster recorded Holman's voice as he
screamed and pounded on the bars of his jail
cell. 24 7 Holman filed suit, claiming that police vio-
lated his privacy when they told the media he was
in custody. 248 The district court ruled that report-
ing the fact of an arrest and detention did not
constitute invasion of privacy. 249
Another inmate plaintiff in Jones/Seymour v. Le-
Febvre, was similarly unsuccessful.2 50 The plaintiff
243 See, e.g., Holman v. Central Ark. Broad. Co., 4 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd, 610 F.2d 542 (8th
Cir. 1979) (claiming a violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
§1983, specifically the constitutional right to privacy derived
firom the penumbras of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments); Hicks v. Cassilly, 971 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md.
1997), rev'd, 961 F.2d 1567 (3d. Cir. Pa. 1992) (alleging a vio-
lation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and constitutional
right to privacy); Jones/Seymour v. LeFebvre, 19 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2064 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (claiming a violation of
the constitutional right to privacy); Jones v. Taibbi, 508 F.
Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1981) (alleging a violation of civil rights
under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and invasion of privacy); Higbee v.
Times-Advocate, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2372 (S.D. Cal.
1980) (claiming a violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
§1983 and invasion of privacy); Mimms v. Phila. Newspapers,
Inc., 352 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (alleging a violation of
civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and invasion of privacy);
Delan v. CBS, Inc., 91 A.D.2d 255 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)
(claiming a violation of the constitutional right of privacy).
244 Holman v. Central Ark. Broad., 4 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979). affd, 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir.
1979) (holding a violation of constitutional right to privacy).




249 Id. at 2303 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1975)).
250 Jones/Seymour v. LeFebvre, 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2064 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd, 961 F.2d 1567 (3d Cir. 1992).
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 See Trespass Cases, supra note 94.
254 See, e.g., Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir.
1997); Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Snpp. 2d 726 (S.D.
Ohio 1997); Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Stipp.
703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745
was a state prisoner who claimed that the defen-
dant prison superintendent permitted a television
crew to film him without consent.2 5' In 1992, a
federal district court held that the facts in Jones!
Seymour were "not egregious enough" to state a
cause of action for violation of the constitutional
right to privacy. 25 2
H. Trespass
Trespass was claimed in thirteen cases identi-
fied for this study, making it a fairly common
cause of action to stem from a ride-along.2 53 Every
trespass claim resulted from the presence of tele-
vision reporters, 2 5 4 or newspaper photogra-
phers25 5-never a print reporter working alone.
Most resulted from the presence of reporters in a
private home 256 or other traditionally private loca-
tions, such as a private school. 257 A variety of offi-
cials were involved, from an animal welfare
worker to a fire marshal.2-5 8 Most were enforce-
(N.D. Cal. 1993); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr.
668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Green Valley Sch., Inc. v. Cowles
Fla. Broad., 327 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Bel-
luomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d 832 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1979); Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 893
S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295
N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
255 See Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 24 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher,
340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976);
256 See, e.g., Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d
726 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983
F. Stipp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F.
Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232
Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Nichols v. Ga. Television
Co., 552 S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Anderson v. WROC-
TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Fla. Publ'g
Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976).
257 See, e.g., Green Valley Sch., Inc. v. Cowles Fla. Broad.,
327 So.2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
258 See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997);
Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio
1997); Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp. 703
(N.D. Ohio 1997); Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 24 Me-
dia L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Baugh v. CBS, Inc.,
828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Miller v. Nat'l Broad.'Co.,
232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Fla. Publ'g Co. v.
Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976); Green Valley Sch., Inc.
v. Cowles Fla. Broad., 327 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976); Nichols v. Ga. Television Co., 552 S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2001); Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d
832 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979); Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441
N.Y.S.2d 220, 223 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Carr v. Mobile Video
Tapes, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Prahl v.
Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
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ment officials of some type, but in two cases they
were members of helping professions-an advo-
cate for victims of domestic violence,2 59 and a
team of paramedics..2 6 1' Courts had a sympathetic
ear for the media in four cases. 26 '
Trespass protects against physical intrusions
into the home, or other private areas in which
one has a possessory interest.26 2 Tort liability may
result from entry to property without the permis-
sion of the owner or occupier.2 6-3 Consent is,
therefore, a critical issue in any trespass case, and
the ride-along cases are no exception. Although
some legal scholars have argued for a privilege to
trespass in order to gather news,2 64 courts have
been reluctant to recognize one.265
The media have used one of two defenses to
claims of trespass resulting from a ride along: an
official permission agreement or the "custom and
usage" defense. In an official permission agree-
ment, media argued that the officials were accom-
panying gave them permission to enter the private
property. In these situations, the media argued
that the officials, rather than the owner, were in
control of the property and thus able to grant
such permission, in the "custom and usage" de-
fense, the media claimed that there is a long his-
tory of officials allowing the media to accompany
them as they perform their duties. In other
words, it is acceptable because things always have
been done that way.
Courts uniformly rejected this argument, how-
ever, stating that authorized officials did not have
the power to grant permission to non-officials to
enter private property.2 66 A Florida appeals court
259 Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
261) Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986).
261 Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp. 703
(N.D. Ohio 1997); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745
(N.D. Cal. 1993); Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc., 596
P.2d 832 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979); Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher,
340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976).
262 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §158 (1965).
263 Id.
264 Note, And Forgive Them Their Trespasses: Applying the
Defense of Necessity to the Criminal Conduct of the Newsgatherer,
103 HARV. L. REV. 890 (1990).
265 See Paul A. LeBel, The Constitutional Interest in Getting
the iVezs: Toward a First Amendment Protection from Tort Liability
for Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 Wm. & MARY BILL. RTs. J. 1145,
1158-1159 (1996). See also Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978);
Stahl v. State, 665 P.2d 839 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (declin-
ing to recognize a privilege to trespass in the name of
stated that to uphold such an assertion, "could
well bring to the citizenry of this state the hobnail
boots of a Nazi stormtrooper equipped with glar-
ing lights invading a couple's bedroom at mid-
night with the wife hovering in her nightgown in
an attempt to shield herself from the scanning TV
camera."
267
In one case, however, the media prevailed de-
spite the lack of the possessor's consent. That
case, Florida Publishing v. Fletcher2 1 18 was decided by
the Florida Supreme Court in 1976, and was also
the earliest ride-along trespass case identified for
this study. In Fletcher, firefighters and police gath-
ered at the scene of a fatal house fire and invited
the news media to accompany them, as was their
standard practice 26-) Media representatives en-
tered the house through the open door.2 7 I There
was no objection to their entry; the homeowner
was away and the remaining householder, a teen-
age girl, was dead.27 ' The media representatives
did not damage any of the property.2 72 They only
entered for the purpose of covering the news of
the fire and death.2 7 - The fire marshal needed a
picture of the silhouette left on the floor after re-
moval of the girl's body.2 74 The marshal had run
out of film, however, so a newspaper photogra-
pher took a picture that became part of the offi-
cial investigation file.2 75
Sadly, the dead girl's mother first learned of the
fire and her daughter's death by reading the
newspaper story and viewing the published photo-
graphs. 2 7 6 The mother filed suit, claiming tres-
pass, among other causes of action.2 7 7 But, the
court ruled that the journalists lawfully entered
newsgathering).
266 See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 516 (9th Cir.
1997); Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726, 746
(S.D. Ohio 1997); Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 24 Me-
dia L. Rep. (BNA) 2332, 2334 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Green Valle)
Sch., Inc. v. Cowles Fla. Broad., 327 So. 2d 810, 819 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1976); Nichols v. Ga. Television Co., 552 S.E.2d 550
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Anderson v. WROC TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d
220, 223 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
267 Green Valley Sch., Inc. v. Cowles Fla. Broad., 327 So.
2d 810, 819 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
268 Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976).











the Fletcher home under the doctrine of com-
mon custom, usage, and practice. 278 The court
noted that the "fire was a disaster of great public
interest,'"2 79 and that it had become customary for
the news media to enter private property where
such a disaster has occurred.2 18 °
Some courts, deciding subsequent trespass
cases, have taken great pains to distinguish Fletcher
from the case at bar.28 ' In these cases, media de-
fendants have attempted to invoke this "custom
and usage" defense, but to no avail. 28 2 Sometimes,
courts explicitly rejected the custom and usage ra-
tionale.28S Other times, courts have emphasized
that the media aided in the official investiga-
tion.2 8
4
In addition, to using the custom and usage de-
fense to defend himself against the trespass claim,
the television newsman in Prahl v. Brosamle, also
insisted that he had a privilege under the First
Amendment to gather news.28 5 The court rejected
this argument, 28 6 as have other courts in trespass
cases that did not involve ride-alongs. 28 7 In addi-
tion, accompanying authorized officials did not
help journalists to defeat claims of trespass. The
media have generally prevailed only when the pos-
sessor consented to their entry,28 8 even when the
plaintiff argued that consent was given under du-
278 Id. at 918.
279 Id. (quoting dissenting opinion from state district
court's decision in Fletcher v. Fla. Publ'g Co., 319 So. 2d 100,
113 (Fla. App. 1 1975)).
280 Id.
281 See, e.g., Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 517 (9th Cir.
1997); Anderson v. WROC TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1981).
282 See, e.g., Green Valley Sch., Inc. v. Cowles Fla. Broad.,
327 So. 2d 810, 819 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Anderson v.
WROC TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Prahl
v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 779 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
283, See, e.g., Green Valley Sch., Inc. v. Cowles Fla. Broad.,
327 So. 2d 810, 819 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Anderson v.
WROC TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
284 See, e.g., Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Fletchers, 340 So. 2d 914,
915 (Fla. 1976).
285 Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 780 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1980).
286 Id. at 781.
287 See, e.g., Le Mistral, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815
(N.Y. App. Div. 1978); Stahl v. State, 665 P.2d 839 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1983).
288 E.g., Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
289 E.g., Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp.
703 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
290 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997); Bar-
rett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726, 746 (S.D. Ohio
1997); Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp. 703
ress and therefore, invalid.2 ) 9 Courts have pro-
tected citizens from police overreaching their co-
ercive power in these cases.
I. Intentional Infliction
Intentional infliction of emotional distress was
a cause of action in seven ride-along cases, 29 °1 and
four found a sympathetic ear in court.29 1 All seven
stemmed from the actions of television crews, and
all but one,2 92 involved the TV crew's intrusion
onto private property, usually a home. Two of
these plaintiffs were the bereaved relatives of a de-
ceased person,293 and one was a battered wife. 294
Thus, half the plaintiffs were considered victims
rather than suspects. Officials involved in these
cases included a victim's advocate, 29 5 a team of
paramedics, 296 a Humane Society officer,2 97 and a
tactical rescue team. 298
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress protects emotional security. 299 This tort
has been used to combat collection agencies and
other creditors who use high-pressure methods;
insurance adjusters using aggressive tactics to
force a settlement; and, landlords who try to
harass unwanted tenants into moving.3 00 In recent
years, the tort has been used in employment
(N.D. Ohio 1997); Crowley v. Fox Broad. Co., 851 F. Supp.
700 (D. Md. 1994); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745
(N.D. Cal. 1993); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr.
668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc.,
893 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
291 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997); Bar-
rett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio
1997), Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993);
Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
292 Crowley v. Fox Broad. Co., 851 F. Supp. 700 (D. Md.
1994) (involving footage of the plaintiff rescuing two teenag-
ers from a fast-moving river).
293 Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726
(S.D. Ohio 1997) (involving the daughter of suicide victim):
Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (involving widow of heart attack victim).
294 Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
295 Id.
296 Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986).
297 Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 613
(Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
298 Crowley v. Fox Broad. Co., 851 F. Supp. 700 (D. Md.
1994).
299 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 (1965).
300 See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social De-
cency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 42,
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law-in cases of workplace sexual misconduct."'"
In family law, it has been used in divorce proceed-
ings as a way to get a larger share of the marital
estate.11 2 And in media law, intentional infliction
has emerged as a cause of action, as plaintiffs be-
gin to recognize that other legal remedies, such as




Courts typically employ a four-part test to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim of
intentional infliction: (1) the defendant intended
to cause emotional distress, or knew or should
have known that the actions taken would result in
serious emotional harm to the plaintiff; (2) the
defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous;
(3) the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff's
distress; (4) the emotional distress was severe..3 0 4 A
study of claims of intentional infliction against the
media showed that although courts usually re-
jected cases based on the content of a report, they
sometimes had a sympathetic ear for cases based
on journalists' newsgathering behavior. 30 5
All of the ride-along cases claiming intentional
infliction of emotional distress were, by defini-
tion, based on behavior of the media and some of
these plaintiffs did indeed find a sympathetic ear
in court. For instance, the claims that passed the
summary judgment hurdle were based on journal-
44-49 (1982).
301 See Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress and Employment at Will: The Case Against 'Tortification'of
Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1994).
302 See Bradley A. Case, Turning Marital Misery into Finan-
cial Fortune: Assertion of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Claims by Divorcing Spouses, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 101
(1995).
303 See Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress as a Cause of Action Against the Media, 5
COMM. L. & POL'Y 469, 470 (2000).
314 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 (1965).
305 See Markin, supra note 303, at 491-94.
306 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997) (tak-
ing place at a ranch); Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F.
Supp. 2d 726, 746 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (taking place in the
home); Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp. 703
(N.D. Ohio 1997) (concerning the home); Baugh v. CBS,
Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (taking place in the
home); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (involving the home).
307 Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp. 711
(N.D. Ohio 1997); Crowley v. Fox Broad. Co., 851 F. Supp.
700, 704 (D. Md. 1994).
' o18 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997) (in-
volving a U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service agent who wore a wire
in cooperation with CNN as he entered private home);
Brown v. Am. Broad. Co., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir. 1983) (in-
volving a television crew that surreptitiously filmed an instr-
ists' entry onto private property.3 6 Even though
the tort protects emotional security, courts appear
to be linking this emotional security to violation
of one's physical security. In fact, in the two in-
tentional infliction cases decided in favor of the
media, courts based their analysis on the content
of the broadcast rather than journalists' news-
gathering behavior.3 1 7
J. Illegal Electronic Surveillance
Four claims of illegal electronic surveillance
arose from ride-alongs. - 1 -1 Not surprisingly, all in-
volved electronic media, either television' 1 9 or ra-
dio.3 10 All were brought under Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control Act.3 1 Commonly re-
ferred to as the federal eavesdropping statute, this
law protects the privacy of wire and oral commu-
nications and delineates the circumstances under
which interception of such communications may
be authorized.31 2
The incidents leading to the claims occurred in
places that the plaintiff considered private, in-
cluding the home,3" a private ranch, 1 4 and ajail
cell. 3 15 Two of the claims arose from an investiga-
tion by congressional investigatory committee
members into fraudulent insurance sales to the
elderly.3 16 The others involved the police,31 7 and
ance saleswoman under investigation by Congress); Benford
v. Am. Broad. Cos., 554 F. Supp. 145 (D. Md. 1982) (concern-
ing a television crew that surreptitiously filmed an insurance
salesman under investigation by Congress); Holman v. Cen-
tral Ark. Broad. Co., 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark.
1979), affd, 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979) (concerning a law-
yer's drunken rantings from a jail cell, which were audible
from public street and were recorded and aired on the ra-
dio).
309 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997);
Brown v. Am. Broad. Co., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir. 1983); Ben-
ford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 554 F. Stipp. 145 (D. Md. 1982);
3 11 Holman v. Central Ark. Broad. Co., 4 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd, 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir.
1979).
311 18 U.S.C. §2510 et seq. (1994).
312 Id. §2511.
313 Brown v. Am. Broad. Co., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir.
1983); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 145 (D.
Md. 1982).
314 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997).
315 Holman v. Central Ark. Broad. Co., 4 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2300, 2302 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd, 610 F.2d 542 (8th
Cir. 1979).
316 Brown v. Am. Broad. Co., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir.
1983); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 554 F. Supp. 145 (D. Md.
1982).
317 Holman v. Central Ark. Broad. Co., 4 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2300, 2302 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd, 610 F.2d 542 (8th
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agents of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 18
At least one legal scholar has argued for a quali-
fied First Amendment privilege against tort liabil-
ity for surreptitious newsgathering based on the
value of the social good that flows from press ac-
quisition of information.3  A review of the illegal
electronic surveillance claims identified for this
study, however, showed that courts did not recog-
nize such a privilege.3 20 Benford v. ABC, which re-
sulted from a congressional investigation of insur-
ance fraud, illustrates this point.32 ' ABC claimed
it was acting under color of law and therefore was
exempt from the provisions of the federal eaves-
dropping statute. The federal district court in this
case, decided in 1980, disagreed. It stated: "Ex-
tending protection to private individuals acting in
concert with government officials, when their pur-
pose is self-serving, thwarts this primary congres-
sional objective of protecting individual pri-
vacy."322 This court apparently did not view ABC's
activity from the perspective that democracy
would be enhanced by press acquisition of infor-
mation.
The court made a similar holding in Brown v.
American Broadcasting Company, a separate case
that arose from the same congressional investiga-
tion.3 23 ABC offered a defense based on the con-
sent provision of the eavesdropping statute, which
states that the prohibition against electronic sur-
veillance does not apply when one of the parties
consents to the surveillance. 324 The congressional
parties had, of course, consented to the surveil-
Cir. 1979).
318 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997).
319 See LeBel, supra note 265.
321 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997);
Brown v. Am. Broad. Co., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir. 1983); Ben-
ford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 554 F. Supp. 145 (D. Md. 1982);
Holman v. Central Ark. Broad. Co., 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd, 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979).
321 Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 554 F. Supp. 145 (D. Md.
1982).
322 Id. at 1162 (emphasis added).
323 Brown v. Am. Broad. Co., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cit.
1983).




328 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 516 (9th Cir. 1997).
329 Id.
330 Brown v. An. Broad. Co., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir.
1983); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 145 (D.
Md. 1982); Holman v. Central Ark. Broad. Co., 4 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd, 610 F.2d 542 (8th
Cit. 1979).
lance.3 2 5 But, plaintiff Brown noted that the con-
sent exception does not apply when a communi-
cation is intercepted for the purpose of commit-
ting a crime or tortious act. 3 26 The court agreed,
and held that the broadcaster's intention in tap-
ing the meeting was an issue of fact for a jury to
decide. 32 7 Evidently, the court did not assume
that the broadcaster was an entity involved in new-
sgathering that would serve a democratic society.
Consent was the pivotal issue in the two cases in
which the media prevailed. In Berger v. Hanlon,
the Ninth Circuit noted that the wildlife service
agent, who wore a wire for CNN when he entered
the home of a suspect, was a party to the conversa-
tion and agreed to its interception. Therefore,
CNN was not liable under the federal eavesdrop-
ping statute. 328 The court noted that the agent
was acting under the authority of a search war-
rant.329 None of the other officials involved in the
eavesdropping cases identified for this study was
executing a warrant. 330 Holman v. Central Arkansas
Broadcasting Co., the case filed by the jailed
drunken lawyer, also included an unsuccessful
eavesdropping claim. As the court noted, "[t]he
Plaintiff knew he was being interviewed." 33 1
IV. ANALYSIS
In a ride-along, an authorized official provides
the media with access to a situation that would
otherwise be inaccessible.3 32 Sometimes, this in-
volves physical trespass onto private property333 or
' Holman v. Central Ark. Broad. Co., 4 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2300, 2302 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd, 610 F.2d 542 (8th
Cir. 1979).
332 See, e.g., Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (involving a private home); Jones/Seymour v. Le-
Febvre, 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2064 (E.D. Pa. 1992) and
Huskey v. NBC, 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (taking
place in a prison); Pierson v. News Group Publ'ns, 549 F.
Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (involving military reservation);
and Shulman v. Group W. Prods., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998)
(involving a medical rescue helicopter).
'33 E.g., Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997);
Barrett v. Outlet Broad. Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio
1997); Reeves v. Fox TV, 983 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997);
Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers, 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332
(E.D. Pa. 1996); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D.
Cal. 1993); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986); Fla. Publishing, v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914
(Fla. 1976); Green Valley Sch., Inc. v. Cowles, 327 So. 2d 810
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Nichols v. Ga. Television Co., 552
S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441
N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Carrv. Mobile Videotapes,
893 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295
N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
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other traditionally private locations, such as pris-
ons. -1 4 Other times, it involves electronic access
through a hidden microphone ,:3'1 or the ability to
listen to an otherwise private conversation be-
tween an official and another individual." '! In
these situations, plaintiffs have perceived govern-
ment and the media as posing threats to their pri-
vacy and property interests. Government repre-
sentatives typically have been present in one of
two capacities: to enforce the law, 3 7 or to help
with an emergency.""" The media have claimed
they had a First Amendment right to ride along
because they were serving in their capacity as a
watchdog on government, or as an informer of
the electorate. 3 ,9
Generalizations about the law of ride-alongs
3'34 Holman v. Central Ark. Broad. Co., 4 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd, 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir.
1979); Huskey v. NBC, 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. 111. 1986);
Smith v. Fairman, 98 F.R.D. 445 (C.D. Ill. 1982); Mimms v.
Phila. Newspapers, 352 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
.335 E.g., Brown v. ABC, 704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir. 1983);
Benford v. ABC, 554 F. Supp. 145 (D. Md. 1982).
33.16 E.g., Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997).
137 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Berger
v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997); Parker v. Boyer, 93
F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Stack v. Killian, 96 F.3d 159 (6th
Cir. 1996); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994);
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971);
Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 142 F. Supp. 2d 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Lyde v. New York City, 145 F. Supp. 2d 350
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Nichols v. Hendrix, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1503 (N.D. Ga. 1999); Swate v. Taylor, 12 F. Supp. 2d 591
(S.D. Tex. 1998); Barrett v. Outlet Broad. Inc., 22 F. Supp.2d
726 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Hicks v. Cassilly, 971 F. Supp. 956 (D.
Md. 1997); Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp.
703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers, 24 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848
F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), affd by Ayeni v. Mottola, 35
F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994); Avenson v. Zegart, 577 F. Supp. 958
(D. Minn. 1984); Moncrief v. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1620 (N.D. Ohio 1984);Jones v. Taibbi, 508 F. Supp.
1069 (D. Mass. 1981); People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239
(Colo. Ct. App. 1993); Green Valley Sch., Inc. v. Cowles Fla.
Broad. Inc., 327 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Nichols
v. Ga. Television Co., 552 S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001);
Belluomo v. KAKE TV, 596 P.2d 832 (Ct. App. Kan. 1979);
Stern v. OfficerJohn Doe, 806 So. 2d 98 (La. Ct. App. 2001);
Diaz v. Univision Television Group, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2245 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Penwell v. Taft
Broad. Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Magenis
v. Fisher Broad., Inc., 798 P.2d 1106 (Or. Ct. App. 1990);
Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
3318 Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal.
1993); Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998);
Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
'19 See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th
Cir. 1971); Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp.
703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Hagler v. Phila. Newpapers, 24 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828
F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Huskey v. NBC, 632 F. Supp.
can be placed in four categories. First, the cases
are divided according to whether they involved of-
ficial liability or media liability. Within these two
groups, the cases are divided by the nature of the
alleged harm, and whether it involved a property
interest or a privacy interest, broadly construed.
The cases involving official liability are fairly
straightforward. During ride-alongs, officials can-
not allow the media to ride along during the exe-
cution of a warrant. The U.S. Supreme Court has
held that the special power provided by a warrant
is for the official alone.3 41 Plaintiffs claimed offi-
cial liability primarily in the civil rights cases, 
3 4 1
and in a few of trespass cases.3 4 2 Most of the au-
thorized individuals involved in these cases were
enforcement officials of some sort-police, 
3 4
1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Pierson v. News Group Publ'ns, 549 F.
Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Smith v. Fairman, 98 F.R.D. 445
(C.D. Il1. 1982); Higbee v. Times-Advocate, 5 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2372 (S.D. Cal. 1980); Shulman v. Group W Prods.,
955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998); Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d
914 (Fla. 1976); Stern v. OfficerJohn Doe, 806 So. 2d 98 (La.
Ct. App. 2001); Anderson v. WROC-TV, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981);
Delan v. CBS, Inc., 458 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983);
Penwell v. Taft Broad., 469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984); Haynik v. Zimlich, 508 N.E.2d 195 (Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga
Cty., Ohio 1986); Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes, 893 S.W.2d
613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
'340 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999); see also
Brunette v. Humane Soc'y, 294 F.3d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir.
2003).
41 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Ayeni v.
Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994); Holman v. Central Ark.
Broad., 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd,
610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979); Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202
(2d Cir. 2000); Lyde v. New York City, 145 F. Supp. 2d 350
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Swate v. Taylor, 12 F. Supp. 2d 591 (S.D.
Tex. 1998); Hicks v. Cassilly, 971 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1997);
Hagler v. Phila . Newspapers, 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332
(E.D. Pa. 1996); Avenson v. Zegart, 577 F. Supp. 958 (D.
Minn. 1984).
342 Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726
(S.D. Ohio 1997); Hagler v. Democrat-News, 699 S.W.2d 96
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
143 Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996);
Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 142 F. Supp. 2d 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Lyde v. New York City, 145 F. Supp. 2d 350
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Holman v. Central Ark. Broad. Co., 4 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd, 610 F.2d 542 (8th
Cir. 1979); Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000);
Nichols v. Hendrix, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1503 (N.D. Ga.
1999); Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D.
Ohio 1997); Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp.
703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Moncrief v. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1620 (N.D. Ohio 1984);Jones v. Taibbi, 508 F. Supp.
1069 (D. Mass. 1981); Higbee v. Times-Advocate, 5 Media L.
Rep. 2372 (S.D. Cal. 1980); People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d
239 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); Nichols v. Ga. Television Co., 552
S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Hagler v. Democrat-News,
699 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Diaz v. Univision Televi-
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animal safety officers, 344 or federal agents. 345
These individuals wielded coercive power even
when they were not executing a warrant. Courts
tended to favor plaintiffs claiming official liability
in the civil rights cases. 346 Courts also had a sym-
pathetic ear for the plaintiff who claimed official
liability in Barrett, a trespass case that did not in-
volve a warrant;3 47 and, the plaintiff who claimed
official liability in Benford, a 1982 eavesdropping
case. 348 Official liability cases, for the most part,
involved threats to the plaintiffs' security on their
property rather than threats to a privacy inter-
est. 
49
Media liability cases are more varied, involving
threats to the plaintiffs' security in their prop-
erty,3511 as well as threats to a broadly defined no-
tion of privacy. 35' As noted previously in this arti-
sion Group, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2245 (NJ. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 2001); Penwell v. Taft Broad. Co., 469 N.E.2d
1025 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Magenis v. Fisher Broad., Inc.,
798 P.2d 1106 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295
N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
344 Bnnette v. Humane Soc'y of Ventura County, 294
F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 2002); Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441
N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Carr v. Mobile Video
Tapes, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
345 Bergerv. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997); Stack
v. Killian, 96 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 1996); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35
F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994); Rogers v. Buckel, 615 N.E.2d 669
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
346 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Ayeni
v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994); Hagler v. Phila. News-
papers, 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Swate
v. Taylor, 12 F. Supp. 2d 591 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
347 Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726
(S.D. Ohio 1997).
348 Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 554 F. Supp. 145 (D. Md.
1982).
-49) See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Ayeni
v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994); Swate v. Taylor, 12 F.
Supp. 2d 591 (S.D. Tex. 1998) Hagler v. Phildelphia. Newspa-
pers, 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Avenson
v. Zegart, 577 F. Snpp. 958 (D. Minn. 1984).
'5) See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997),
vacated, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999); Parker v.
Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,
449 F.3d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Nichols v. Hendrix, 27 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1503 (N.D. Ga. 1999); Barrett v. Outlet Broad.,
lnc, 22 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848
F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos.,
502 F. Supp. 1159 (D. Md. 1980); People v. Henderson, 847
P.2d 239 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); Nichols v. Ga. Television Co.,
552 S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
3-51 See Mullins v. Bookman, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2374 (N.D. Ga. 1995);Jones/Seymour v. LeFebvre, 19 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 2064 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Moncriefv. Hanton, 10
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1620 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Smith v. Fair-
man, 98 F.R.D. 445 (C.D. I1l. 1982);Jones v. Taibbi, 508 F.
Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1981); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d
768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980); Mimms v. Phila. Newspapers, 352 F.
cle, the media argue that they have a First Amend-
ment right to ride along because they are serving
in their capacity as a watchdog on government, or
an informer of the electorate. 3 52 However, courts
have not always embraced these First Amendment
arguments. 3 53
As in the official liability cases, courts deciding
media liability cases sometimes protected plain-
tiffs' property interests.35 4 They were sympathetic
to the plaintiff when the media accompanied-
physically or electronically-authorized officials
into someone's home.355 Not all courts waxed as
poetic as Rehnquist did in Wilson when he dis-
cussed the long history of the sanctity of the
American home. 356 But, generally, courts have ac-
corded the same respect to this traditionally pri-
vate space. 35 7 Courts were also sympathetic about
Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Stern v. OfficerJohn Doe, 806 So.
2d 98 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Diaz v. Univision Television
Group, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2245 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 2001).
352 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999);
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cit. 1971);
Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726, 747 (S.D.
Ohio 1997); Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Cos., 632 F. Supp. 1282,
1290 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d
469, 477 (Cal. 1998); Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 683
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Stern v. Officer John Doe, 896 So. 2d
98, 101-102 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Hagler v. Democrat-News,
699 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Diaz v. Univision Tel-
evision Group, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2245, 2248 (NJ.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441
N.Y.S.2d 220, 222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Delan v. CBS, Inc.,
458 N.Y.S.2d 608, 613 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Penwell v. Taft
Broad. Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
353 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 613 (1999);
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971);
Barrett v. Outlet Broad. Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726, 748 (S.D.
Ohio 1997); Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Cos., 632 F. Supp. 1282,
1290 (N.D. IlI. 1986); Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d
469, 495 (Cal. 1998); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr.
668, 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441
N.Y.S.2d 220, 223 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
354 See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997);
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Bar-
rett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio
1997); Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994),
affd, Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994); Nichols v.
Ga. Television Co., 552 S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
355 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609-610 (1999);
Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999), vacating 129 F.3d 505
(9th Cir. 1997); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th
Cir. 1971); Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726
(S.D. Ohio 1997); Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.
N.Y. 1994), affd, Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
356 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609-610 (1999).
357 See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997);
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Bar-
rett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio
1997); Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994),
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other traditionally private spaces that were not
homes: the medical rescue helicopter in Shul-
man358 and the prison exercise cage in Huskey. -5
When the plaintiff in a media liability ride-
along claim alleged a threat to his or her privacy
interest, the results were mixed. Plaintiffs seldom
prevailed in claims of false light" ' or private
facts.3"' In the latter, the newsworthiness defense
was common..'6 2 Sometimes, however, plaintiffs
found a sympathetic ear in court when they
affd, Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994); Nichols v.
Ga. Television Co., 552 S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
358 Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal.
1998).
3. 9 Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D.
111. 1986).
1160 Eight false light cases were identified for this study.
The media prevailed in five: Reeves v. Fox Television Net-
work, 983 F. Stipp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Stern v. Officer
John Doe, 806 So. 2d 98 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Hagler v. Dem-
ocrat-News, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Diaz v.
Univision Television Group, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2245 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Penwell v. Taft Broad.
Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Magenis v.
Fisher Broad., Inc., 798 P.2d 1106 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); Carr
v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994). The plaintiff prevailed in one: Pierson v. News Group
Publ'ns, 549 F. Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
361 Eight private facts cases were identified for this study.
The media prevailed in five: Reeves v. Fox Television Net-
work, 983 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Pierson v. News
Group Publ'ns, 549 F. Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Shulman v.
Group W. Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998); Diaz v.
Univision Television Group, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2245 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Penwell v. Taft Broad.
Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Carr v. Mobile
Video Tapes, Inc., 893 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)).
The plaintiff prevailed in two: Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F.
Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 632
F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. IIl. 1986).
362 See, e.g., Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F.
Supp. 703, 709 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Pierson v. News Group
Publ'ns, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 635, 639-40 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Shul-
man v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478-479 (Cal.
1998); Penwell v. Taft Broad. Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025, 1027-
1028 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc.,
893 S.W.3d 613, 622 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
363 Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1282
(N.D. 111. 1986); Shulman v. Group W. Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d
469 (Cal. 1998); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 893
S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
364 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997), va-
cated by, 526 U.S. 808 (1999); Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc.,
22 F. Stipp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828
F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232
Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Carr v. Mobile Video
Tapes, Inc., 893 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
365 See Brunette v. Humane Soc'y of VentUra County, 294
F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2002); Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d
Cir. 2000); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997);
Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Stack v. Killian,
claimed intrusion -6 -3 or intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 36 4 These torts protect the pri-
vacy and, one might argue, the dignity of the indi-
vidual, which inevitably leads to the nature of the
harm that occurred in the ride-alongs.
At the root of all ride-along claims is an elec-
tronic or photographic medium: television cam-
era crews,3_ 65 audio recording -6 6 or newspaper
photographers.3 67 Plaintiffs were people who were
the target of media scrutiny, and found the gath-
96 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 1996); Brown v. Am. Broad. Co., 704
F.2d 1296 (4th Cir. 1983); Caldarola v. County of Westches-
ter, 142 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Lyde v. New York
City, 145 F. Stipp. 2d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Robinson v. City of
Philadelphia, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1317 (E.D. Pa. 2001);
Nichols v. Hendrix, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1503 (N.D. Ga.
1999); Swate v. Taylor, 12 F. Supp. 2d 591 (S.D. Tex. 1998);
Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. StIpp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio
1997); Hicks v. Cassilly, 971 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1997);
Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp. 703 (N.D.
Ohio 1997); Mullins v. Bookman, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2374 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362
(E.D.N.Y. 1994), affd sub nom. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680
(2d Cir. 1994); Crowley v. Fox Broad. Co., 851 F. Supp. 700
(D. Md. 1994); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D.
Cal. 1993); Jones/Seymour v. LeFebvre, 19 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2064 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 632
F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Moncrief v. Hanton, 782 F.2d
1042 (6th Cir. 1985); Benford v. Am. Broad. Co., 554 F.
Supp. 145 (D. Md. 1982); Smith v. Fairman, 98 F.R.D. 445
(C.D. I11. 1982);Jones v. Taibbi, 508 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass.
1981); Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998);
Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986); People v. Colorado, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo. Ct. App.
1993); Green Valley Sch., Inc., v. Cowles Fla. Broad., Inc., 327
So. 2d 810 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976); Nichols v. Ga. Television Co.,
552 S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Belluomo v. KAKE TV &
Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d 832 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979); Stern v. Of-
ficer John Doe, 806 So. 2d 98 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Diaz v.
Univision Television Group, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2245 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Delan v. CBS, Inc., 91
A.D.2d 255 (N.Y. App. Dir. 1983); Anderson v. WROC-TV,
441 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Rogers v. Buckel, 615
N.E.2d 669 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Penwell v. Taft Broad Co.,
469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Haynik v. Zimlich,
508 N.E.2d 195 (Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1986);
Magenis v. Fisher Broad., Inc., 798 P.2d 1106 (Or. Ct. App.
1990); Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 613
(Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768
(Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
366 See Holman v. Central Ark.. Broad. Co., 4 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2300 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd, 601 F.2d 542 (8th
Cir. 1979).
367 SeeWilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Dietemann
v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Hagler v. Phila.
Newspapers, Inc., 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa.
1996); Hagler v. The Democrat-News, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 96
(E.D. Mo. 1985); Avenson v. Zegart, 577 F. Supp. 958 (D.
Minn. 1984) (discussing "media representatives"); Pierson v.
News Group Publ'ns, 549 F. Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982);
Mimms v. Phila. Newspapers, 352 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa.
1972); Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976).
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ering of photos, footage, and audio offensive.
These forms of newsgathering have also gener-
ated complaints about sensational journalism. '8
As journalism has become more "sensational,"
courts have been more likely to construe it as en-
tertainment rather than news. 36? Courts with a
sympathetic ear for the plaintiff in these ride-
along cases have described the information
sought as entertainment material rather than
news about a matter of public concern.3 70 They
tended to brand emotion-evoking electronic re-
ports as commercial entertainment, in contrast
with the staid gray columns of newspaper text.37 1
Both the news/entertainment and electronic/
print dichotomies are cause for concern from a
First Amendment perspective.
Many courts and commentators have said that
stories about ride-alongs constitute entertainment
rather than news and, are thus, less worthy of First
Amendment protection than speech related to
self-governance.' 72 Though some courts are fer-
vent in decrying ride-alongs as mere entertain-
ment,3 7- it is a weak rationale for denying First
Amendment protection. It is a form of regulation
on the basis of content, pure and simple.
The U.S. Supreme Court dealt with this issue a
half-century ago, and its analysis is worth revisiting
for its striking relevance to the ride-along cases.
In Winters v. New York, decided in 1948, the Court
dealt with the question of whether lurid, racy sto-
ries of crime and lust were protected by the First
Amendment.3 7 4 At issue was a magazine contain-
ing "criminal news, police reports, and accounts
of criminal deeds, and pictures and stories of
deeds of bloodshed, lust and crime."'3 75 The Court
368 Moss, supra note 10.
369 See generally Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955
P.2d 469, 494 (1998) (stating, "Arguably the last thing an in-
jured accident victim should have to worry about while being
pried from her wrecked car is that a television producer may
be recording everything she says to medical personnel for the
possible edification and entertainment of casual television
viewers.").
370 See, e.g., Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 512 (9th Cir.
1997); Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362, 368 (E.D.N.Y.
1994), affd sub noma. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir.
1994); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 494
(Cal. 1998).
371 See, e.g., Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 510 (9th Cir.
1997); Nichols v. Hendrix, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1503,
1505 (N.D. Ga. 1999); Swate v. Taylor, 12 F. StIpp. 2d 591,
596 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Miller v Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr.
668, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
372 SeeJohnston, supra note 61; Rothe, supra note 61. See
also Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1994) (high-
ruled that the publication was worthy of First
Amendment protection. 3765 As the Court ex-
plained, "We do not accede to appellee's sugges-
tion that the constitutional protection of a free
press applies only to the exposition of ideas. The
line between the informing and the entertaining
is too elusive for the protection of that basic
right ... [w]hat is one man's amusement, teaches
another's doctrine. 3 77
A closely related criticism of ride-along pro-
grams is their commercial nature. The issue of
whether the profitability of a message affects the
degree of First Amendment protection it is af-
forded was addressed by the Supreme Court in
1952 in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson.378 In that
case, the Court held that the motion-picture in-
dustry's profitable films were worthy of First
Amendment protection. 379 The court declared,
"[t]hat books, newspapers and magazines are
published and sold for profit does not prevent
them from being a form of expression whose lib-
erty is safeguarded by the First Amendment." The
Court continued, that "[w] e fail to see why opera-
tion for profit should have any different effect in
the case of motion pictures. '" 381' Taken together,
the holdings of Winters and Burstyn indicate that
courts are on shaky ground when they suggest
that ride-alongs are not worthy of First Amend-
ment protection due to their entertaining and
commercial nature. The courts have viewed elec-
tronic and print media differently. This is cause
for concern because control of the type of media
permitted to cover events is tantamount to con-
trol of content, according to legal scholar Steven
Helle.38 l He used Garrett v. Estel 8 2 to illustrate
lighting law enforcement theatrics); Berger v. Hanlon, 129
F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing "television entertain-
ment"); Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2000)
(explaining ". . . an inherently fictional dramatization of an
event that transpired hours earlier."); Shulman v. Group W
Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 494 (Cal. 1998) (involving
entertainment of casual television viewers.").
373 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 512 (9th Cir. 1997),
vacated, 526 U.S. 808 (1999); Shulman v. Group W Prods.,
Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 494 (Cal. 1998).
374 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
375 Id. at 509.
376 Id. at 510.
377 Id.
378 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501
(1952).
37q Id. at 501-502.
380 Id.
381 Helle, supra note 19, at 47.
382 Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977).
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that newsgathering and publication are insepara-
ble. 38 3 In Garrett v. Estelle, the Fifth Circuit of the
U.S. Court of Appeals stated that a television cam-
eraman had no greater right than the public to
film an execution.'18 4 The court stated that the
cameraman was not prohibited from simulating
or recounting the incident, and therefore could
convey the same content as the two print report-
ers allowed to witness the execution. 8 5 Helle ar-
gued that the fact that a simulation or narrative
was acceptable, but that a broadcast was not, sug-
gested that the content of the latter must differ in
a substantive way from the content of the for-
mer.3 8" Such restriction of expression raises con-
stitutional questions, Helle stated, citing Cohen v.
California, in which the U.S. Supreme Court
found that, "the emotive function . . .may often
be the more important element of the overall
message sought to be communicated. '"3 87
Some of the most valuable ride-along journal-
ism is arguably also some of the programming de-
cried as sensational entertainment. The broad-
casts that prompted Shulman v. Group W Products,
Jnc., the rescue helicopter case,1 8  and Baugh v.
CBS, Inc., the domestic violence victim case, 3 89
were found to be offensive to the plaintiffs, but
also gave the public a rare look at the work of
some unsung heroes-an emergency flight nurse
and a victim's advocate. Courts did not accuse the
helping professionals of inviting the media to
ride-along out of a lust for self-aggrandizement, 1 "4 '
383, Helle, supra note 19.
384 Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274, 1278-79 (5th Cir.
1977).
385 Id. at 1276-77.
386 Helle, supra note 19, at 48.
387 Id. at 49 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
26 (1971)).
388 Shulnan v. Goup W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal.
1998).
3189 Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
390 See, e.g., Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D.
Cal. 1993); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469
(Cal. 1998); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
391 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 613 (1999)
(ruling that it was "good public relations for the police");
Lauro v. City of New York, 39 F. Supp. 2d 351, 364 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (declaring that, "The publication of plaintiff's arrest by
means of the perp walk had the effect ... of... allowing Det.
Charles to appear on television.") rev'd, Lauro v. Charles, 219
F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000).
392 See Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Stipp. 745 (N.D. Cal.
1993); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal.
1998); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct.
as they did the enforcement officials. '"'I Nonethe-
less, the courts are, in effect, declaring that the
media may not barge uninvited into private
homes or medical vehicles to capture these sto-
ries.3 9 2 Plaintiffs apparently do not want to share
these stories with the public, perhaps, to borrow
the term from Cohen v. California,- 3 because of
their "emotive" power.
While the long-standing American aversion to
government intrusion in individual affairs3 : 4 has
guided the courts in ride-along cases involving of-
ficials with coercive power, this was not the case
with the ride-alongs involving helping profession-
als. Rather, the distaste that courts and plaintiffs
have shown for the helper ride-alongs appears to
stem from a desire to protect human dignity,3 95 a
proposition which lacks strong legal support in
the United States.
A distinction between privacy and dignity has
been discussed in the context of labor law.-9 " This
distinction, discussed by Lawrence E. Rothstein, is
useful for analyzing the ride-alongs involving
helping professionals, even though the Shul-
man,3 9 7 Baugh,398 and Milles'".' courts did not ex-
plicitly discuss it. American law is characterized as
taking a possessive and territorial view of privacy,
according to Rothstein. 40 1 From this viewpoint,
privacy is treated as a property right.41' As Roth-
stein notes, "Privacy is associated with one's home
and . . . with premises under one's control. '" 4 0 2
App. 1986).
39 1 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
394 See generally Green Valley Sch., Inc. v. Cowles Fla.
Broad., 327 So. 2d 810, 819 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (ex-
pressing this attitude by the "hobnail boots" quotation).
395 See Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 758 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (declaring that "Baugh was vulnerable"); Shulman
v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 494 (Cal. 1998) (find-
ing that "the last thing an injured accident victim should
have to worry about ... is that a television producer may be
recording everying she says ..."); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co.,
232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (emphasizing
the "alarming absence of sensitivity and civility").
396 Lawrence E. Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity? Electronic
Monitoring in the Workplace, 19 N.Y.L. ScH.J. INT'L & CONI P. L.
379 (2000).
"197 Shulman v. Group W. Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal.
1998).
398 Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
399 Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986).
40 Rothstein, supra note 396, at 381.
401 i.
492 Id. at 382.
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This view of privacy is evident in the civil rights40 3
and trespass40 4 claims reviewed earlier in this pa-
per.
In contrast, the "concept of human dignity is a
social one that promotes a humane and civilized
life. The protection of human dignity allows a
broader scope of action against treating people in
intrusive ways." 4 0 5 This notion, prevalent in conti-
nental European countries, is more concerned
with "community and citizenship than prop-
erty."40 6 This body of law deals with "actions that
reduce a person's status as a thinking being, a citi-
zen and a member of a community. '" 40 7 Now, let
us consider the nature of the plaintiffs in the ride-
along cases.
Many were people who did not have normal
control over their environment. They could not
consent to the media coverage that led to the
suit.408 Courts seldom articulated this notion of
consent unless it was explicitly related to the
4o03 See Civil Rights Cases, supra note 92.
404 See Trespass Cases, supra note 94.
405 Rothstein, supra note 396, at 383.
406 Id.
407 Id.
408 See Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000);
Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 142 F. Supp. 2d 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Lyde v. City of New York, 145 F. Supp. 2d
350 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F.
Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Hagler v. Phila. Newspapers,
Inc., 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Mullins
v. Bookman, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2374 (N.D. Ga. 1995);
Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd sub
noma. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994); Baugh v.
CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993);Jones/Seymour
v. LeFebvre, 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2064 (E.D. Pa. 1992);
Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill.
1986); Pierson v. News Group Publ'ns, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 635
(S.D. Ga. 1982); Smith v. Fairman, 98 F.R.D. 445 (C.D. Ill.
1982); Holman v. Central Ark. Broad. Co., 610 F.2d 542 (8th
Cir. 1979); Mimms v. Phila. Newspapers, 352 F. Supp. 862
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (inmate); Shulman v. Group W. Prods., Inc.,
955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal.
Rptr. 668, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Stern v. Officer John
Doe, 806 So. 2d 98 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Nichols v. Ga. Televi-
sion Co., 552 S.E. 2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Delan v. CBS,
Inc., 458 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Haynik v. Zim-
lich, 508 N.E.2d 195 (Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga City., Ohio 1986).
409 See Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal.
1993); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App.
1980).
410 See Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000);
Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 142 F. Supp. 2d 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Lyde v. City of New York., 145 F. Supp. 2d
350 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F.
Supp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Jones v. Taibbi, 508 F. Supp.
1069 (D.Mass. 1981); Haynik v. Zimlich, 508 N.E.2d 195 (Ct.
C.P. Cuyahoga City, Ohio 1986); Nichols v. Ga. Television
Co., 552 S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
411 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Parker v.
cause of action, as in the trespass cases. 4 1 But a
pattern emerged across the plaintiffs. Some were
crime suspects, 410 or lived in the homes of crime
suspects, and were confronted by warrant-wield-
ing police. 4 1 In other cases, they were trauma vic-
tims, 4 12 or their family members4 1'3-some in liter-
ally life-or-death situations-seeking aid from
health professionals 4' 4 or victim's advocates. 415
Other examples included inmates,416 a soldier on
a military reservation, 41 7 and a mentally disabled
person in a hospital.418 Clearly, many of them
were in no position to evict the media from the
premises.
Also in the media liability cases, some officials
were members of the "helping professions"-the
flight nurse in Shulman,419 the victim's advocate in
Baugh,420 and the paramedics in Miller.4 2 1 Courts
were sympathetic to plaintiffs in these cases also,
specifically citing the victim's vulnerability at the
time of the media encounter. 422 Although no
Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Hagler v. Phila. Newspa-
pers, Inc., 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2332 (E.D. Pa. 1996);
Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), affd sub
nom. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
412 Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal.
1998).
413 Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726
(S.D. Ohio 1997); Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986).
414 Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal.
1998); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 682 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986).
415 Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
416 Mullins v. Bookman, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2374
(N.D. Ga. 1995); Jones/Seymour v. Le Febvre, 19 Media
Rep. (BNA) 2064 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Huskey v. NBC, 632 F.
Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Smith v. Fairman, 98 F.R.D. 445
(C.D. Ill. 1982); Holman v. Central Ark. Broad. Co., 610 F.2d
542 (8th Cir. 1979); Mimms v. Phila. Newspapers, 352 F.
Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
417 Pierson v. News Group Publ'ns, 549 F. Supp. 635
(S.D. Ga. 1982).
418 Delan v. CBS, Inc., 458 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div.
1983).
419 Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal.
1998).
420 Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
421 Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986).
422 See Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 758 (N.D.
Cal. 1993); Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 494
(Cal. 1998) (stating that "the last thing an injured accident
victim should have to worry about.., is that a television pro-
ducer may be recording everything she says . . ."); Miller v.
Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)




court explicitly stated it, their holdings indicate
that those who need the services of a public
helper, such as a paramedic or social worker, do
not necessarily make themselves a limited public
figure, or "fair game" for the media. This ratio-
nale echoed that of Time v. Firestone,423 in which
the U.S. Supreme Court held that Mary Alice Fire-
stone's divorce proceeding was "not the sort of
'public controversy"' referred to in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc..4 24 Nor was she a public figure. The
Court noted that Mrs. Firestone was compelled to
go to court to seek relief in a marital dispute. 42 5
In both Shulman42 6 and Baugh,42 7 the courts
criticized the media for taking advantage of vul-
nerable victims. Even though the legal claims in
those cases were intrusion and intentional inflic-
tion, respectively, the courts appeared to be trying
to protect human dignity as it is viewed in Europe.
Because this notion is not clearly developed in
American law, it manifested itself in more than
one type of tort claim. The cases reviewed in this
paper reveal an interest by the courts in protect-
ing plaintiffs from assaults on their dignity by the
media, whom they view as grubbing for entertain-
ing content that will yield high ratings. 42 8
Media ride-alongs with officials are also ethi-
cally problematic, representing a Faustian bargain
for the press. Rather than allowing journalists to
check on official conduct, the ride-along is a
chance for officials to manipulate coverage of gov-
ernment. Government decides when the media
can ride along. This is control of content, in the
same sense as prohibiting the cameraman in Gar-
rett429 from broadcasting the execution. The in-
423 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
424 Id. at 454 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 351 (1974), which defines the limited public figure, but
not "public controversy").
425 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
426 Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal.
1998).
427 Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
428 See Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal.
1993); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal.
1998); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986).
429 Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977).
4:3 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 613 (1999)
(declaring that, "[slurely the possibility of good public rela-
tions for the police is simply not enough, standing alone, to
justify the ride-along intrusion into a private home."); Ayeni
v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that "[a]
private home is not a soundstage for law enforcement theatri-
cals.").
formation resulting from a ride-along is tainted.
Courts have suggested as much when they have
criticized law enforcement officials who permitted
ride-alongs as being self-serving. 4  °
So when-if ever-can a journalist ride along
with authorized officials and avoid liability? Ac-
companying officials to a public place seems to
protect a journalist from most civil rights,-" "l tres-
pass 43 2 and privacy claims. 4" A crucial question is
whether the journalist sees what any other visitor
to the premises sees, or is instead given special
treatment by officials. Thus, the innocent by-
stander in the drug bust in Penwell did not suc-
ceed in a claim of false light,4 4 but the victims of
the perp walks staged in Haynik v. Zimlich4 3 5 and
Lyde v. New York City4-3 6 were able to proceed with
their cases. Limiting ride-alongs to public places,
however, will not eliminate lawsuits. Journalists
can still face subpoenas if they witness a crime on
the ride-along, as happened in the shield law
cases discussed earlier.43 7
V. CONCLUSION
The law of ride-alongs has been evolving hap-
hazardly over the past thirty years. The Court's
decision in Wilson 438 began to set limits on this
practice, which has become increasingly common
because it serves the media's bottom line. The
fact that a program is entertaining and profitable
is not grounds for reducing its First Amendment
protection. Rather, the problems with the ride-
along result from the way they throw off kilter the
roles of the press, public, and government. A
43 1 See, e.g., People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1993) (ruling for the media in a case where the media
flew over the home of a person suspected of growing mari-
juana).
432 See, e.g., Belluomo v. KAKE TV, 596 P.2d 832 (Ct.
App. Kan. 1979) (ruling for the media in the only trespass
case identified for this study that arose from an incident in a
public place-a restaurant).
4433 See, e.g., Haynik v. Zimlich, 508 N.E.2d 195 (Ct. C.P.
Cuyahoga City, Ohio, 1986) (holding for the media in a case
involving a perp walk in the hallway of a sheriffs depart-
ment).
434 Penwell v. Taft Broad. Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1984).
4: 5 Haynik v. Zimlich, 508 N.E.2d 195 (Ct. C.P.
Cuyahoga City, Ohio, 1986).
4. 6 Lyde v. New York City, 145 F. Supp. 2d 350 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
437 See, e.g., Lauro v. City of New York, 39 F. Stipp. 2d 351
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
438 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
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ride-along with an enforcement official oversteps
the official's already limited authority to enter a
private home. In turn, by riding along with the
official, the press colludes with the government
representative it is supposed to be monitoring.
Instead of serving the individual, these two institu-
tions end up trammeling the citizen's rights for
the sake of their own self-promotion or profit.
Neither of the two press theories that are justi-
fied by the Constitution-libertarian and social
responsibility-support the ride-along. When the
media ride along, at the pleasure of government
officials who are exercising coercive power, they
cannot argue that they are serving as a check on
the government's power. Such an arrangement
transforms the press from government watchdog
to government lapdog. Similarly, when the media
are disseminating information from a ride-along
that has been approved by government, they can-
not argue that they are serving democracy by pro-
viding reliable information for self-governance.
Rather, the information that flows from such ar-
rangements has been approved by the govern-
ment and therefore, is contaminated.
Less clear-cut are the cases involving helping
professionals. They raise different ethical
problems than the ride-alongs with officials wield-
ing coercive power. These cases are less about
serving as a check on government power and
more about informing the public. Information
439 Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
obtained through official approval may be viewed
as tainted. However, some of the helping profes-
sionals seem to have little to gain from the ride-
along, aside from a brief moment of public glory,
and perhaps public support that would result in
slightly better funding for social services. But, the
officials use their power in a way that distresses
and humiliates plaintiffs, and those plaintiffs have
found a sympathetic ear in court. Courts are al-
lowing such cases to go forward based on an ap-
parent concern for the human dignity of the
plaintiffs.
This paper has found only limited legal justifi-
cation for the press to accompany officials into
traditionally private spaces such as homes. To ob-
serve the law, the press may have to forgo stories
of legitimate public concern, such as the work of
the domestic violence victim's advocate in
Baugh.439 Alternatively, the press may need to ob-
tain victims' permission to ride along in these situ-
ations. Courts appear to be trying to protect the
human dignity of these individuals, despite the va-
rious torts under which the claims are made. The
content the press wishes to disseminate about
such stories-footage of distraught victims being
assisted by an official-cannot always be gathered
by legal means. If the press continues to ride
along, and fails to consider the dignity of those it
covers, it will face consequences in court.
[Vol. 12
